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INTRODUCTION

School choice is one of the most popular and controversial proposals
being considered by education policy makers.' Simply put, school
choice theorists seeks to enhance parents' ability to select schools most
appropriate for their children. The device favored for reaching this
result is the school voucher.2 In a typical voucher plan, the state
would first deliver vouchers to parents. Parents then could submit the
voucher to whichever school they wished their child to attend. In turn,
schools would be reimbursed by the state for the value of the vouchers
each school accumulated.3 Advocates believe that school choice,

1. PeterJ. Weishaar, School Vouchers And The Establishment Clause, 58 ALB. L. REV.
543 (1994); see alsoJulie K. Underwood, Choice is Not A Panacea, 71 EDUC. L. REP. 599

(1992) (stating that the notion of school choice is the predominant reform mechanism
for education in the 1990s); JOHN E. CHUBB & TERI& M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 217 (1990) (declaring that school "choice is a panacea .... It has
the capacity all by itself to bring about the kind of transformation that, for years,
reformers have been seeking to engineer in many other ways."). See genera/!yJEFFREY R.
HENIG, RETHINKING SCHOOL CHOICE: LIMITS OF THE MARKET METAPHOR (1994); DAVID
W. KIRKPATRICK, CHOICE IN SCHOOLING: A CASE FOR TUITION VOUCHERS (1990).
2. Phillip T.K. Daniel, A ComprehensiveAnalysis ofEducationalChoice: Can the Polemic
of Legal Problems Be Overcome?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 17 (1993). Tax deductions also
could facilitate school choice. Id. at 22. Parents of school age children conceivably
would be able to deduct amounts spent on tuition from their taxable income. This
method of creating school choice is not as popular as school vouchers because many
parents who would benefit from school choice may not have enough income to incur
any tax liability;, therefore, a tax deduction would be useless to them. Id.
3. See Weishaar, supra note 1, at 543.
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facilitated through school voucher legislation, can revitalize America's
schools.
Two separate but interdependent themes stir school reform
advocates' interest in school vouchers. First, advocates believe parents,
not politicians and public administrators, should select schools for
their children.4 According to voucher advocates, parents are best able
to determine the educational needs of their children.5 The second
theme flows from the freedom granted to parents in choosing which
schools their children will attend: competition among schools increases
teaching effectiveness and financial efficiency. School voucher
supporters assert that public schools have an unfair price advantage
when compared to private schools. 6 Implementing school voucher
programs would level the educational playing field by requiring both7
public and private schools to subsist exclusively on school vouchers.
Once on equal footing, competition among public and private schools
would unleash market forces that would rid the country of inferior
schools while sparing only those schools fit to attract funding through

4. See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 1, at 48. Opponents of school choice argue that
parents might be swindled by certain schools and make poor decisions about which
schools their children should attend. Kirkpatrick argues that this line of reasoning is
elitist. He suggests that the ultimate question is who is more incompetent at choosing
schools: parents or the government. Doubtless, some parents will choose the wrong
schools for their children. Id. at 49. But one parent's mistake has a limited effect and
remains anonymous. By contrast, public officials' mistakes potentially affect many
children; also, public officials' mistakes will be publicized, which has the effect of
dampening public officials' desire to be innovative. Furthermore, public officials do not
have the attached interest in children that parents do. Id. at 49.
5. See KIRKPATRICK, supranote 1, at 49. For example, parents can choose whether
their children should undergo life-threatening medical procedures. Therefore,
Kirkpatrick argues, it makes little sense to remove parental choice from determining
which types of education their children should receive. Id.
6. See Underwood, supra note 1, at 600. School choice is attractive to reformers
because the cost of sending a child to a private school would become comparable to
sending a child to a public school. Furthermore, parents would be able to avoid
sending their children to schools they deem incapable of meeting their children's
educational needs. To many, according to Underwood, "Choice represents the ultimate
school reform, a quick and easy solution to the problems of public education." Id.
7. Public schools, as they exist now, face no cost competitive adversaries. The
costs parents incur to send their children to private schools are not defrayed by their
share of taxes that support public schools. Under a school voucher plan, public schools
would have no incipient advantage because their funding would not be guaranteed.
Instead, public school funding would rely on the number of vouchers received. See
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE To CHOOSE 161 (1980) [hereinafter FREE];
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 91 (1962) [hereinafter CAPIrrALISM]; see
also David Futterman, School Choice and the Religion Clauses: The Law and Politicsof Public
Aid to Private ParochialSchools, 81 GEo. Lj. 711, 713 (1992-93).
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vouchers.8 After market forces are infused into education, voucher
advocates believe more effective schools, and ultimately a better
educated populace, would follow.
Minnesota Governor Arne Carlson concurs with voucher theorists'
assertions that school choice can cure the ills plaguing America's
education system.' In fact, Carlson's faith in vouchers is so strong that
he declared that passing voucher legislation was his top priority in
1996.10 Carlson vowed that he would "go to the wall" to ensure
voucher legislation's enactment."
Less than one month after
opening the 1996 legislative session, the Senate Education Committee
drew the curtains on Carlson's proposal. 2 Nevertheless, because
vouchers receive strong support from many constituencies, attempts to
enact voucher legislation will continue in future legislative sessions."
The voucher legislation Carlson favored would have allowed
parochial schools to participate." If passed in this form, the legislation would have inevitably faced constitutional challenges. The First
Amendment's Establishment Clause, 5 according to Thomas Jefferson,

8. See Futterman, supra note 7, at 713 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, AMERICA
2000: AN EDUCATION STRATEGY 5-7 (1991) (noting that the concept of vouchers is to
ensure schools are "accountable" by exposing them to free market competition). This
argument implies that parents, acting as educational consumers for their children,
would be able to influence how schools spend money because schools as merchants
would have to satisfy parents as customers. Id.; see also CAPITALISM, supranote 7, at 94-95
(suggesting the voucher system "permits each to satisfy his own taste").
9. Debra O'Connor, CarlsonDetailsVoucherPlanParents Could Use Money To Pay For
Schools Of Choie ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Nov. 16, 1995, at IA.
10. SeeJack B. Coffman, Vouchers Will Alter PoliticalTerrain,ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,

Jan. 16, 1996, at 1A. In seeking enactment of voucher legislation, "[I] egislative leaders
say they have been told the governor's staff will spend 80 percent of its time on the
proposal." Id.
11. Id. Carlson threatened to veto education aid bills failing to include a pilot
voucher program. He stated, "We will go to the wall on that one." Id.
12. Debra O'Connor, SenatePanel Turns Down VoucherPlanGovernorHopesHis School
Proposal Will Get Another Hearing This Session, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 3, 1996, at
1A. Because the Senate Education Committee turned down vouchers, it is expected
that the House Education Committee will not even vote on voucher bills. Id.
13. See Coffman, supra note 10, at 1A. Supporting vouchers are business leaders,
Roman Catholic bishops, Christian conservatives, the Republican party and private
schools. Vouchers' lack of success in the 1996 legislative session probably had more to
do with the Republicans' reluctance to support vouchers in an election year than with
a decline of their popularity. Id.; see also O'Connor, supra note 9, at IA (indicating
school vouchers were unlikely to succeed in an election year).
14. O'Connor, supra note 9, at IA (discussing Carlson's desire to include religious
schools in a school voucher program to expand school choices).
15. U.S. CONST., AMEND I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
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erected "a wall of separation between church and state. " I This wall
is joined by walls separating church and state constructed by
Minnesota's constitution.'
Voucher opponents would assert that
these walls are pierced when school voucher legislation permits
parochial schools to participate. Whether voucher legislation collides
with these walls turns on the U.S. and Minnesota Supreme Courts'
interpretations of federal and state constitutional establishment clauses.
Because Governor Carlson's attempts to enact voucher legislation
failed, the issue of whether voucher legislation in Minnesota can
constitutionally include religious schools never ripened. Yet school
vouchers' popularity insures that bills will be proposed in following
legislative sessions. Therefore, determining whether parochial schools
can constitutionally participate in school voucher programs remains an
important concern for Minnesota's policy makers. This Article
examines this issue.
Part II of this Article explores the theoretical underpinnings of
school vouchers. Additionally, the ascension of vouchers will be
tracked at the federal and state levels, specifically including a discussion of school vouchers in Minnesota. Part III examines whether
school voucher legislation including religious schools is permissible
under the U.S. Supreme Court's analytical frameworks for determining
when governmental actions violate the Establishment Clause. Part IV
examines whether school voucher legislation can withstand scrutiny
under Minnesota's constitutional counterparts to the Establishment
Clause. Part V concludes with a summation of school voucher
legislation's fate when scrutinized under federal and Minnesota
establishment clauses.

16. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879) (citing Jefferson's reply to
an address to him by a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association). Chief Justice
William Rehnquist blasted the notion thatJefferson's statement should be the foundation for Establishment Clause analysis. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-92 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that Thomas Jefferson was not even in the country
when the Establishment Clause was debated, and that James Madison was the driving
force behind the Amendment). Id. at 92. Madison thought the Amendment was
"designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and perhaps to prevent
discrimination among sects." Id. at 98. Madison did not see it as requiring neutrality
on the part of government between government and religion. Id.
17. MINN. CONSr. art. I, § 16. "Nor shall any man be compelled to attend, erect
or support any place of worship, or to maintain any religious ecclesiastical ministry,
against his consent." Id. Also, article XIII, section 2 of Minnesota's Constitution states
that "[i]n no case shall any public money or property be appropriated or used for the
support of schools wherein the distinctive doctrines, creeds or tenets of any particular
Christian or other religious sect are promulgated or taughL" MINN. CONST. art. XIII,

§ 2.
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HISTORY OF SCHOOL VOUCHERS

Vouchers: A Theory for School Improvement
1.

Competition and Parental Choice: EnduringApproachesfor
School Improvement

The belief that competition in education leads to improved learning
among students dates over two centuries." Adam Smith suggested in
An Inquiry Into the Wealth of Nations that allowing students to choose
their own teachers would compel teachers to deliver a quality
education. 9
Students would choose the best teachers available;
ineffective teachers would attract no students, and thus, no income.
The belief that parents should have power over selecting where their
child attends school is not novel either. In The Rights of Man, Thomas
Paine supported granting lower income parents funds derived from
taxes that would allow parents to choose schools for their children.2"
Similar to Smith's view, John Stuart Mill in the 19th century asserted
that teachers' salaries that were unreflective of ability provided no
incentive for teachers to sharpen their educating skills. Hence, he
proposed tying teachers' salaries to their teaching ability to elicit better
teaching. 1 Smith, Paine, and Mill's ideas concerning choice and
competition in education correspond with contemporary views
supporting school voucher programs. Being noted for political and
economic philosophy, rather than education philosophy, their ideas
initially drew little attention.2 2
In contemporary times, Milton Friedman stands as the father of
school choice. 23 Friedman's theories echo those of Smith, Paine, and

18. Daniel, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that Adam Smith and Thomas Paine
supported competition in education).
19. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 333 (1776) (stating that teachers would be shielded from the "necessity of
diligence and attention to their respective pupils" if students were not free to avoid

teachers that were incompetent).
20. THOMAS PAINE, The Rights of Man, in REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN
FRANCE AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 267, 478 (EDMUND BURKE & THOMAS PAINE, 1989).
21. Teachers would be unmotivated to do anything more than absolutely necessary
because they would always be entitled to a predetermined salary, which would be
unrelated to performance. JOHN STUART MILL, EducationalEndowments, in ESSAYS ON
EQUALrxY, LAw, AND EDUCATION, 207, 209 (John Robinson ed., 1984).
22. See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 1, at 25 (noting that neither Smith's nor Paine's
works were considered treatises on education, rather, they were economic and political
documents).

23. James B. Egle, Comment, The ConstitutionalImplications Of School Choice, 1992
WIS. L. REv. 459, 464 (1992).
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Mill.2 4' He proposes that allowing parents to choose which schools
their child attends compels schools to more efficiently and effectively
educate America's youth.25 Public schools, according to Friedman,
are essentially indolent monopolies. 26 Forcing schools to compete for
a limited supply of school vouchers would theoretically eradicate this
monopoly.2 7 Market forces, not political forces, would foster improvements in public education. 2' As an example of how a school voucher
program would function, Friedman pointed to the Servicemen's
Readjustment Act of 1944, or "G.I. Bill."2 9 Veterans were able to

24.

See FREE, supra note 7, at 154. Allowing governments to provide education

reflected "the early emergence among intellectuals of a distrust of the market and of
voluntary exchange." America's school system became an "island of socialism in a free
market sea". Id.; see alsoKIRKPATRICK, supranote 1, at 52. According to Kirkpatrick, "No

other western democracy has so adamantly stood face to face with its principals of
liberty and refused" to recognize that parents should have the right to send their
children to the school of their choice. Id. (quoting VIRGIL BLUM, FREEDOM IN
EDUCATION, 130 (1958)).
25. CAPITALISM, supra note 7, at 94-95. Friedman suggests that subsidizing
institutions, such as public schools, inefficiently allocates resources because all of the
institutions' activities are supported, and not merely those activities that institutions do
well. Id. at 94.
26. Public schools act as monopolies because parents have no plausible choice
when it comes to selecting a school for their children. HENIG, supranote 1, at 59 (citing
CAPITALISM, supra note 7). Either parents pay tuition to send their children to private
schools while already paying taxes to finance public schools, or parents must move so
their children can attend school in another district. Because consumers (i.e., parents)
have no real alternatives, public schools have no incentive to provide either an
inexpensive or quality education because funding remains constant. At least under
private monopolization consumers can theoretically quit consuming the monopolized
product. In contrast, consumers cannot opt out of public monopolies. They must
continue paying taxes. Id.
27.

Daniel, supra note 2, at 25 (citing PETER DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT 131-33

(1974)). Those in business realize that satisfying the customer is the "only way to
guarantee continued existence and growth of the company." Because the public
schools receive no real competition, they have no compelling need to satisfy the
customer (i.e., parents). Id.
28. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 1, at 217. Democratic forces, though revered,
impede school performance because political control requires that bureaucracies ensure
schools are complying with public demands. Chubb and Moe argue that schools driven
by market forces would not require this control and thus would be more efficient.
Additionally, Chubb and Moe conclude that school organization is an important factor
in the productivity of schools. Their studies suggest that schools that are restrained by
inflexible rules are not as effective as more autonomous schools. Political forces and
administrators create and implement burdening rules. By contrast, under a school
voucher program, market forces often determine which rules would be needed. Thus,
schools would have to be well organized and attuned to parents' needs as customers.
Id.
29. FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 161 ("The voucher plan embodies
exactly the same principals as the G.I. bills that provide for educational benefits to
military veterans."). Veterans received vouchers for educational expenses and were free
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attend any school, public or private, while the federal government paid
for tuition. Friedman suggested that the popular and successful G.I.
Bill provided a model for school vouchers to follow."0 Absent from
Friedman's writings is proof that the G.I. Bill improved colleges and
universities; consequently, analogies between the G.I. Bill and voucher
legislation are perhaps useful only for showing that voucher legislation
can be adequately administered."1
2.

School Choice Support: Beyond Free Market Advocates

Most school voucher supporters who concur with the market force
theory for improving schools tend to be conservatives.8 2 Not surprisingly, those opposing school vouchers typically fall in the middle or left
end of the political spectrum. Vouchers, however, also draw support
from various groups critical of traditional public schools who are
unconcerned with the effects of market forces. 3 3 For example, some
have suggested school choice facilitates cultural diversity because
parents will be able to send their children to schools emphasizing
children's cultural heritage. 4 In the future, voucher legislation may

to select which schools to attend. Id.; see also 38 U.S.C. § 3452 (Supp. V 1993) (existing
"G.I. Bill" program).
30. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 1, at 51. Friedman also noted that both France and
England allow local governments to pay tuition for some students to attend private
schools. Id.
31. HENIG, supra note 1, at 118. Friedman and other school voucher supporters
pointed to the G.I. Bill to prove that school vouchers were politically, legally, and
administratively feasible. Friedman made no arguments or displayed no empirical
evidence establishing that the G.I. Bill improved schools' quality. To the contrary, some
veterans defrauded the government by using the money to attend "fly by night" colleges.
Id.
32. See, e.g., HENIG, supra note 1, at 14 ("While the concepts and models associated
with microeconomics have been particularly prominent in public debates, there are at
least four other intellectual routes to choice that do not depend on the market
metaphor.").
33. Id. at 14-20. For example, ChrisJencks, once an editor for the NEW REPUBLIC,
headed a group that established the first federally-funded voucher program. Id. at 6465. The program's purpose, as part of Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty, was to
provide minorities and economically-disadvantaged students with greater education
opportunities. Id. See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text Also, Wisconsin's
voucher program, which is the first state-funded program, was sponsored by State Rep.
Annette "Polly" Williams, (D-Milwaukee) who was Jesse Jackson's 1988 Wisconsin
campaign chairperson. Egle, supra note 23, at 462 n.15.
34. HENIG, supra note 1, at 14-18. Henig distinguishes four groups who advocate
school choice. The first, individual and personal growth advocates, who favor schools
that grant students autonomy to learn at their own pace and through their own methods. Id. at 14-15. Second are community values and cultural diversity advocates, who
feel school choice would encourage community values, which include teaching ethnic
and cultural traditions, as well as religious traditions. Id. at 15-16. Third are the
community power rationalists, who see schools as interest groups which act as local grass
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attract support from parties on both ends of the political spectrum.
Carlson's voucher proposal did not, but future voucher legislative
attempts may tap enough support from traditionally Democraticleaning groups to secure passage.
B.

History of School Vouchers in the Federal Government

Initially, Milton Friedman's theories stirred little interest in school
vouchers.35 By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, vouchers
began receiving attention from academics, conservative think tanks,
and parochial school advocates.3 6 For the first time federal public
officials took a formal interest in school vouchers. The U.S. Office of
Economic Opportunity sought school districts willing to implement a
demonstration voucher program using government funding. 7 Only
one school district, Alum Rock in California, accepted the OEC's
offer."8 Studies of Alum Rock's voucher program found that participating parents viewed the program favorably and took more interest in
their children's education once the program commenced.3 9 Nevertheless, the experiment, begun in 1972, ended five years later when
federal funding was withdrawn.4" Analysts note that only public
schools participated in the program and no teachers were permitted
to be terminated because of vouchers' effects; thus, advocates suggest
the true powers of vouchers were suppressed.4 1 Therefore, many
education policy experts consider the Alum Rock project an unreliable

roots political movements. Fourth is the contingent alliance, who support school choice
merely because it means change, and not for any ideological reasons. Id.
35. Id. at 6. Attention to school choice was "episodic" until it was "grafted" onto
the privatization movement. In fact, into the 1980s the trend was toward more
government involvement in education. Id,
36. Id. at 64. Conservatives were attracted by the laissez-faire theory to educational
improvements. Also, academics were interested in voucher's "intellectual power."
Parochial school supporters felt vouchers would funnel more students to parochial
schools. Id.
37. The U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity was an important department for
Lyndon Johnson's "War on Poverty." Id. at 65. The voucher plan it proposed sought
equality of opportunity for minorities and was not advocated for its market force effects.
Id.

38. Id. at 67.
39. KiRKPATRICK, supranote 1, at92, 95. But seeIHENIG, supranote 1, at 132 (noting
that satisfaction of the Alum Rock project, as well as Milwaukee's current voucher
program, waned in following years when parents found the promises made by voucher
proponents were not being realized); infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
40. HENIG, supra note 1, at 67 (noting that the Alum Rock school district did not
have the finances to maintain the program without federal assistance).
41. Id. at 120; cf. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 1, at 95 (suggesting the Alum Rock's
example was not followed by other school districts because information about it was not
dispersed).
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1996
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forecast of the effects an unfettered school voucher program would
42
foment.
As time passed, the perceived failings of America's public schools
created a political climate favorable for spawning school reform
proposals. 4
Critics insisted that America's public schools were
producing children unable to attain their foreign peers' education
levels." In 1981, a prominent national report stated that America's
public schools were falling into a "rising tide of mediocrity that
threatened the very survival of America."45 Policy makers searched
for ways to curb the perceived failings of America's schools. Many
believed school vouchers were the answer.
Throughout two presidential terms, President Reagan urged
Congress to pass voucher legislation.46 These attempts failed, but
interest in school vouchers had been piqued.47 In 1991, the Bush
Administration developed legislation promoting school choice.' A
major portion of President Bush's "America 2000,"" was dedicated to

42. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 1, at 308-09 n.50 (noting that the Alum Rock project
was "ill fated" because of poor design and implementation and therefore, the project
.cannot meaningfully be a test of anything"); see also HENIG, supra note 1, at 120
(noting that voucher proponents give little weight to the Alum Rock project's results).
43. See Underwood, supra note 1, at 599 (noting the popularity of vouchers has
recently "caught fire" when confidence in public schools declined).
44. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 1, at 1. America's schools have been subject to
"savage" criticism for not meeting the needs of children. Id. Schools have been failing
to provide an adequate education in core courses, drop out rates have increased, and
mean SAT scores of high school seniors dropped throughout the 1970s. Id.; see, e.g.,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DIGEST OF
EDUCATION STATISTICS 127 (1995). The mean SAT scores of college bound seniors in
Mathematics and Verbal testing declined from 1966 to 1980. However, the statistics
show a leveling off of this trend and slight increases in SAT scores since 1980. Id.
45. Daniel, supra note 2, at 6 (citing NATIONAL COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN
EDUCATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR
EDUCATION REFORM, A REPORT TO THE NATION AND THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 5
(1983)); cf HENIG, supra note 1, at 26 (citing Paul E. Peterson, Background Paper, in
Twentieth-Century Fund, Making the Grade,at 30). Nearly every decade an educational
crisis is said to be looming. Peterson, supra at 30. Crises have been alleged in the
1920s (inefficiency), 1930s (fiscal problems resulting from the Great Depression), 1950s
(the Soviet Union's challenge of the United States' technological supremacy), and 1960s
(racial integration and excessive bureaucratization). Id. As a result of these continual
"crises," Peterson suggests "caution be exercised" so policy makers will not overreact.
Id.
46. HENIG, supra note 1, at 72 (noting efforts were made by the Reagan
Administration in 1983, 1985, and 1986 to enact voucher programs).
47. Id. at 73 (noting a READERS' GUIDE TO PERIODICAL LITERATURE survey showing
the number of newspaper articles concerning school vouchers rose in the 1980s).
48. H.R. 2460, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
49. H.R. 2460, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The bill was coined the "America
2000 Excellence in Education Act." [hereinafter America 2000] Id. at 2.
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establishing a federally-funded school voucher program.50 Pursuing
a "G.I. Bill for Children" President Bush continued pressing for school
choice legislation in 1992."' President Bush's defeat in 1992 at least
temporarily dampened the chance that school voucher legislation
would be enacted at the federal level."2 Nevertheless, a steady stream
of school choice proposals, often implemented through vouchers,
3
continue to be introduced in Congress.
C.

History of School Vouchers in State Governments

State legislature have made sporadic attempts to enact voucher-type
programs. For example, Virginia's General Assembly created legislation granting tuition vouchers to children of veterans killed or disabled
in World War II." In the early 1970s, legislators in Massachusetts and

50. Tide V was devoted to promoting school choice in an effort to strengthen
academic performance of America's students. H.R. 2460, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., Title
V (1991). The bill proclaimed that "choice in education creates market-based accountability, encourages school diversity and competition and provides parents with a
sense of investment in their schools." Id. § 501. Furthermore, the bill stated that
economically-disadvantaged children deserved the same access to schools as other, more
economically-advantaged children. Id. In 1992, then-President George Bush proposed
"G.I. Bills for Children," which would create scholarships for low income students,
allowing them to attend public, private, and religious schools. HENIG, supra note 1, at
92-93.
51. S. 3010, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (referred to as the "Federal Grants for
State and Local 'G.I. Bills' for Children Act"). This bill would have granted scholarships
to lower-income students to attend private and parochial schools. Id. § 2; see also S. 2,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 202(d) (1) (1992) (suggesting implementation of a federallyfunded school choice program).
52. See HENIG, supra note 1, at 200. In the 1992 presidential campaign, Bush
supported voucher programs that would include private and religious schools. Id.
Clinton, however, argued for school choice only among public schools, a far less
contentious proposition. The National Education Association, an extremely influential
teachers' union, would feel less threatened by a school choice program that did not
include private schools. Id.
53. E.g., S.618, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposing a voucher program for
low-income families in inner-city school districts); S.829, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(promoting school choice through vouchers); H.R. 1640, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(suggesting creation of school choice programs for low-income families); H.R. 2270,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (seeking school choice in the District of Colombia); S.
2633, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (enhancing school choice through school
vouchers); cf Frank R. Kemerer, The Constitutionalityof School Vouchers, 101 EDUc. L. REP.
17 (1995). With the Republicans gaining control of both houses of Congress, the
chances of voucher proposals being implemented at the federal level have increased.
Id. at 17 n.1. Also, Republican Presidential candidate Senator Bob Dole has touted
federal school voucher legislation. Mike Glover, Dole Backs Vouchers For Schools, THE
PLAIN DEALER, (Cleveland), Nov. 5, 1995, at 10A. Joining Dole in supporting federal
voucher legislation was 1996 Republican Presidential Candidate Lamar Alexander.
Matthew Miller, Where's The Beef, TIME, Mar. 4, 1996, at 37.
54. Almond v. Day, 89 S.E.2d 851, 852 n.1 (Va. Ct. App. 1955).
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Washington favored implementing school choice programs similar to
current school voucher proposals.55 These programs intended to
reimburse parents for tuition expenses incurred by sending children
to sectarian and non-sectarian private schools.5 6 Perhaps as a precursor to current voucher legislation attempts, Virginia's and Washington's
Supreme Courts determined their states' respective programs would
unconstitutionally aid religion, while Massachusetts' constitution
forbade even private schools from receiving public funds.
Doubts about the ability of public schools to prepare children for
future employment were felt by state legislators too. In response, state
policy makers set out to cure public schools' ills. Sweeping reforms
were enacted, including more stringent graduation requirements,
longer school years, and higher academic performances of future
teachers.5
Some states initiated school choice programs. 9 Various
municipalities created "magnet" schools that permitted parents to send
The increased attention
their children to specialized schools.'
schools received was reflected by the fact that per pupil expenditures

55. See Weiss v. Bruno, 509 P.2d 973, 976 (Wash. 1973); Opinion of the Justices,
259 N.E.2d 564, 565-66 (Mass. 1970).
56. Weiss, 509 P.2d at 976. The legislation struck unconstitutional made grants
available to low income students for use in schools of their choice. Id. The proposal
reviewed by Massachusetts Supreme Court would have granted $100 to school children
that could be used at any school, including parochial schools. Opinion of theJustices, 259
N.E.2d at 566.
57. Virginia's Supreme Court held the tuition grants unconstitutional because they
would have permitted state funds to support religion. Almond, 89 S.E.2d at 858
(applying VIRG. CONST. § 58, which states "no man shall be compelled to.. . support
any religious worship, place or ministry whatever" and VIRG. CONST. § 67 prohibiting
the General Assembly from "mak[ing] any appropriation of public funds... to any
church... society, [or] association ... controlled by" religious institutions).
Washington's Supreme Court held that tuition grants resulting in "indirect" and
"incidental" aid supporting parochial schools violated the state's constitution. Weiss, 509
P.2d at 978. Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that tuition grants could
not support private schools, whether parochial or not. Opinion of theJustices, 259 N.E.2d
at 566.
58. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 1, at 10. States' attempts to reform their public
schools were "frenetic." Reforms included more stringent teacher qualifications, stricter
graduation requirements, and harsher disciplinary policies. Also, teacher merit pay,
longer school years, and longer school days were touted as cures to America's public
school problems. Id.
59. Id. at 10. A large number of states introduced stricter graduation requirements, increased teacher certification standards and salaries, created longer school days,
and introduced "magnet schools." Id.; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 120.062 (1994) (allowing
students to attend any public school in or out of that child's school district); OHIO REV.
CODE. ANN. § 3313.97 (Baldwin 1995) (creating an open enrollment program in Ohio).
60. HENIG, supranote 1, at 112.
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on education increased nearly fifty percent during the 1980s.61
Nevertheless, America's confidence in public schools was unaffected
by these reforms.62
Interest in school vouchers exploded at the state level in the late
1980s and early 1990s. Numerous bills were introduced to state
legislatures that would create school voucher programs. 63 In California, a tuition voucher proposal was submitted to a referendum vote.'
The proposal was soundly defeated, but the referendum vote brought
increased focus on vouchers.6 5 Currently, a number of private
voucher programs are being operated.66 The only publicly-funded
school voucher plan exists in Wisconsin.67 However, Ohio enacted68
voucher legislation that will take effect in the 1996-1997 school year.
These pilot voucher programs focus on providing school choice to
inner-city school children whose parents have low incomes.69

61. See DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION, OFFICE OF
EDUCATION RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENTS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION, at 49 (1995). In
1980, per-pupil spending in average daily attendance was slightly over $4,000 in constant
1987 dollars. By 1990, expenditures had increased to nearly $6,000 per pupil in
constant 1987 dollars. Id.
62. Egle, supra note 23, at 461 (citing NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION OFFICE
OF EVALUATION ON RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENTS DIGEST OF EDUCATION, which
indicated that in 1981 the public rated public schools 2.20 on a scale of 4, while in 1990
the nation rated schools as a 1.98).
63. For a nonexclusive list of state legislative activity concerning vouchers, see S.B.
1287, 41st Leg., Ariz. (1993); H.B. 1343, 58th Gen. Assem., Colo. (1992); S.B. 86, 137th
Gen. Assem., Del. (1993); S.B. 1302, 13th Leg., 2d. Sess., Fla. (1994); S.B. 812, 88th
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., I11.(1993); H.B. 2853, 74th Leg. 2d. Sess., Kan. (1991); S.P 431,
115th Leg., 2d Sess., Me. (1991); H.B. 1119, 398th Leg. Sess. Md. (1992); S.B. 92, 74th.
Reg. Sess., Tex. (1995).
64. MichaelJ. Stick, EducationalVoucher: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 28 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 423, 425 (1995). A proposed voucher program in California, called
proposition 174, failed in a referendum vote in November 1993. Other states with
strong support for school vouchers include Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania,
Arizona, NewJersey, Connecticut, and South Dakota. Id. at 425 n.17.
65. Weishaar, supranote 1, at 543 (citing Dan Morain & Sandy Banks, State Voters
Reject School Vouchers 2-1, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3 1993, at 1). The voucher proposal, coined
Proposition 174, would have permitted children to attend public, private, and parochial
schools using state funded tuition vouchers. Id.
66. Currently, private funded voucher programs exist in Indianapolis, Milwaukee,
Atlanta, and San Antonio; more are expected to develop. Michael Heise, PublicFunds,
Private Schools and the Court: Legal Issues and Poliy Consequences, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
137 (1993).
67. SeeWIs. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West 1991). Wisconsin's school voucher program
was amended to allow parochial schools to participate. 1995 Wis. Legis. Serv. § 119.23
(2)(a).
68. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974-.979 (Page Supp. 1995) (Title 33).
69. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 119.23, subd. 2(a) (1) (West 1991). Families with an income
below 175% of the federal poverty level are eligible. Id.; Thomas Suddes, Budget Accord
Has Few Su~ises HighlightsAre Tax Cut And Voucher Piot, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
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D. School Vouchers in Minnesota
A number of laws designed to curb eroding student performance in
public schools have been enacted in Minnesota.7" The Legislature
passed the Post Secondary Enrollment Option Act, which allows high
school students to attend college classes while receiving credits that
could satisfy curriculum requirements at either secondary or postThe Legislature also passed "magnet" school
secondary schools.7
legislation to encourage school districts to expand opportunities for
disadvantaged children.72 Additionally, the state enacted a school
choice program that allows students to attend any public school
desired.73 Minnesota's school reforms have been considered the most
sweeping in the country.74 Little evidence suggests that these reforms
Consequently,
have increased student performance, however.75

June 25, 1995, at IA (declaring Cleveland's voucher program would be available to lowincome families).
70. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 1, at 154-55 (citing TIM MAZZONI & BARRY SULLIVAN,
STATE GOVERNMENT AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM IN MINNEsOTA, THE FISCAL, LEGAL AND
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF STATE REFORM OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 189,

190 (Van Mueller & Mary McKeown eds., 1986)). The Minnesota Citizens League
called for deregulating and decentralizing education through parental choice. Id. at
155. Then Governor Rudy Perpich called for state-wide educational choice legislation,
which was passed in 1988. Id.
71. MINN. STAT. § 123.3514, subd. 1-5 (1994).
This legislation establishes a
72. MINN. STAT. § 124C.498, subd. 1 (1994).
metropolitan magnet school program. The law makes funds available for school
districts to create magnet schools that can meet disadvantaged children's needs. Id.
The Legislature also passed a law allowing school boards to sponsor licensed teachers'
efforts to establish outcome-based schools. MINN. STAT. § 120.064, subd. 1-5 (1994).
73. MINN. STAT. § 120.062 (1994). Two limitations prevent unfettered open
enrollment among public schools. First, school districts may opt to deny students from
entering its schools. MINN. STAT. § 120.062, subd. 3 (1994). Additionally, students may
be prevented from crossing district boundaries if their resident district is under a
desegregation plan. MINN. STAT. § 120.062, subd. 5. (1994); see also HENIG, supra note
1, at 123 (noting that 88% of white open enrollment applicants in Minneapolis were
denied transfer). These restrictions, coupled with the fact that only public schools can
participate, render Minnesota's open enrollment plan unsatisfying to many school
choice advocates. Id.
74. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 1, at 210. Those who have been affected by
Minnesota's reforms are satisfied with the changes and reportedly believe they are
benefitting from the programs. However, the results of the reforms are preliminary.
Id.
75.

E.g.,

MINNESOTA

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,

MINNESOTA

EDUCATION

OVERVIEW, DATA MANAGEMENT, table 5.5 at 31. Minnesota's high school dropout rate
has been increasing steadily through the 1980s and 1990s. Id.; cf. MINNESOTA
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, FAMILY & LEARNING, REPORT

TO THE GOVERNOR AND 1995 LEGISLATURE (1995). Minnesota students' ACT scores are
higher than the national average, but since 1980 they have dropped slightly relative to
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Minnesota's education reforms have not placated school voucher
advocates.76
According to voucher advocates, schools will not see measurable
improvements until the state implements school voucher legislation.77
Minnesota Governor Arne Carlson's interest in school vouchers reflects
this belief.7 The voucher bill he supported was intended to grant
families in Minneapolis, St. Paul, Brooklyn Center, and at least one
rural school district tuition vouchers redeemable at any school,
whether it's public, private, or sectarian.79 If passed, this legislation
would have been a small but crucial step toward realizing many
available to all Minnesota
voucher advocates' goal of making8 vouchers
0
parents with school-aged children.
Heading into Minnesota's 1996 legislative session, vouchers carried
strong public support."' One poll showed that fifty-seven percent of
those responding supported a voucher program in Minnesota. 2

the national average. Id.
76. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 1, at 210 ("The Minnesota reforms do not go nearly

far enough, failing to free the supply of schools, continuing to control them from
above, and leaving all the traditional institutions in place."); see also KIRKPATRICK, supra
note 1, at 154 (stating that in 1986, then Rep. John Brandle believed Minnesota's
changes were "mere tinkering" and were not adequately addressing Minnesota's public
school problems).
77. Debra O'Connor, Vouchers Testimony Emotional SchoolPlan Reviews Depth of Debate
on Education'sPlace, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Jan. 27, 1996, at IB; see Thomas Collins,
PrivateSchool SupportersHigh-Five VoucherProposal-SomeEducationEntrepreneurssay Subsidy
a Bit Low, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Nov. 16, 1995, at IA.
78. See Thomas Collins, Carison Stumps for School Vouchers, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
Sept. 21, 1995, at lB. Minnesota Governor Arne Carlson supports school vouchers

because he believes a voucher program "will set up a healthy competition between
public and private schools where the real winners are children." Id. at 6B; Debra
O'Connor, Bill Would Give the Poor PrivateSchool Vouchers, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Feb.
7, 1995, at lB.

79. The bill introduced in the 1996 Legislature would have made vouchers
available to students in school district 1 in Minneapolis, school district 625 in St. Paul,
school district 286 in Brooklyn Center, and one out-state district. H.B. 2651, 79th Leg.,
1st Sess., § 7, subd. 3, Minn. (1995). To be eligible, parents' income must be no
greater than 275% of the federal poverty income level. Id.
80. Carlson would eventually like to grant all parents with school-aged children
school vouchers. See O'Connor, supra note 9, at IA.
81. Debra O'Connor, Minnesotans Split On School Vouchers Opinions Haven't Shifted
Since Fal ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Jan. 24, 1996, at 1A. Public opinion polls show a

majority of those polled favor school voucher legislation. Id.
82. Id. In a poll conducted over two days querying 805 randomly-selected adults
who claimed to vote regularly in state elections, 57% said they favored a school voucher
proposal while 34% did not. Id. Nine percent of the respondents had no opinion,
while 13% of those supporting vouchers said they should be used only in non-private
schools. Id.
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Though school voucher bills have been introduced in other sessions,"
the Governor's support, along with the public's, fueled speculation that
some form of voucher legislation would be enacted in 1996.84 After
vouchers' rejection by the Senate Education Committee, school
voucher advocates must now pin their hopes on future legislative
sessions. Yet support for school vouchers will continue until perceptions of public schools improve. 5
Because parochial schools constitute over seventy percent of the
private schools state-wide, measurable increases in competition among
schools will not take place without parochial school participation in a
voucher program. 6 For this reason, many voucher advocates will
insist voucher proposals include parochial schools. If so enacted,
school voucher legislation would be unable to avoid a confrontation
with the walls separating church and state. 7
83. See, e.g., H.F. 562, 79th Leg. Sess., Minn. (1995) (establishing parental choice
program); S.F. 885, 72d Leg. Sess., Minn. (1988) (establishing demonstration voucher
program).
84. See O'Connor, supra note 9, at 1A (suggesting vouchers would receive strong
support with the Governor's support); Coffinan, supra note 10, at IA (noting Steve
Sviggum, a Republican legislator, felt that with the governor's influence, almost all bills
they support end up enacted).
85. See, e.g., Thomas Collins, St. PaulBoard Expected To Oppose Vouchers For Tuition,
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 27, 1996, at 2B. Governor Carlson tried reviving school
vouchers for the 1996 legislative session by offering a $12 million incentive to the St.
Paul City School Board. The money was turned down. In an attempt to sway city
voters, Carlson circulated information indicating that in 40 of 47 elementary schools,
eight of nine middle schools, and four of five high schools over half the students fell
below the national average on achievement tests. Id.; see also Richard Chin, Half of
Minnesota Parents Would Reject Public Schools, Poll Says, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 16,
1994, at 1A. Chin cited a study that found over half of Minnesota parents would send
their children to private schools if financially feasible. Moreover, 61% of Minnesotan's
favored voucher legislation that would allow private and parochial schools to participate.
Id.
86. See MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN, FAMIIuES AND LEARNING DATA MANAGEMENT, INFORMATION ON MINNESOTA
NON PUBLIC SCHOOLS, at 6, 1994-95. Ninety-one percent of Minnesota students
attending private schools do so at parochial schools. Id. at 6, fig. 2. Seventy-one

percent of the private schools in Minnesota are sectarian. Id. at table 7.
87.

See Minnesota Fed'n of Teachers v. Mammenga, 485 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. Ct.

App.) rev. denied, (Minn. 1992). The Minnesota Federation of Teachers challenged the
Post Secondary Enrollment Option Plan, which allows students to attend colleges,
including religiously-affiliated colleges for credit, on the ground that it allowed state tax
dollars to support sectarian interests. Id. The Minnesota Court of Appeals did not

accept this argument. Id.; Sharon Theimer, Former Education Chiefs Support Religious
Options in School Choice, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 6, 1995, at 3C. The Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program was this summer amended to allow vouchers to be submitted
at parochial schools; the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued an injunction against the use
of vouchers in religiously affiliated schools pending its determination of whether the
amendment is prohibited by church-state intermingling. Id.
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III.

SCHOOL VOUCHERS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

The U.S. Constitution prohibits laws respecting an establishment of
religion.' Nearly all constitutional historians agree that the framers
intended to prevent the federal government from creating a stateinstituted religion.89 Beyond this axiom, opinions diverge. Many
argue the wall of separation is breached whenever any governmental
support flows to sectarian interests.9" Others believe that as long as
government aid does not favor religion, there will be no Establishment
Clause violation.91 The U.S. Supreme Court has positioned the
Establishment Clause somewhere between these views.
The Establishment Clause has proven difficult for the Court to
interpret and apply.9" This has been especially true when applying
the Establishment Clause to programs providing public assistance to
parochial schools and parents of children who attend parochial
schools.94 In these circumstances, the "[Court] can only dimly
perceive the lines of demarcation."95 The next section of this Article
determines where the U.S. Supreme Court places this line, and which
side of the line school vouchers legislation that includes parochial
schools falls.
A.

The Lemon Test
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,96 the U.S. Supreme Court developed a threepronged test to determine when public funds can flow to sectarian
interests without offending the Establishment Clause.97 Under Lemon,
a statute first must have a secular purpose.98 Second, the primary
effect of the legislation must neither advance nor inhibit religion. 9

88. U.S. CONST. amend. I; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16.
89. See Ira Lupu, Keeng the Faith: Reliion, Equality, and Speech in the US.
Constitution, 18 CoNN. L. REV. 739, 745-46 (1986).
90. Weishaar, supra note 1, at 545. At the extremes of Establishment Clause
interpretations are two schools of thought.
First are the "non-preferential
accommodationsts," who believe the government can support religion provided no

particular religion is singled out for support. At the other extreme are the "strict
separationists," who say no form of government aid reaching sectarian interests is

allowable. Id.
91. Id.
92. Stick, supra note 64, at 445-46.
93. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 392-93, 402 (1983).
94. Id. at 393.

95. Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
96. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
97. Id. at 612-13.
98. Id. at 612.

99. Id.
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Third, the statute must not foster "excessive government entanglement
with religion."'O° Failing any one of the three prongs renders a
statute unconstitutional.
The first two prongs of Lemon originated in Abington School Districtv.
Schempp. 10' In Schempp, the Court found that a Pennsylvania statute
requiring teachers to read Bible verses at the start of each school day
violated the Establishment Clause. 2 The test applied examined
whether the statute had the purpose or effect of either advancing or
inhibiting religion.'
If the statute did either, it violated the Establishment Clause. The purpose of these two prongs is to ensure that
governments maintain a neutral posture toward religion."°
In Walz v. Tax Commission of New York,' °5 the Court determined
whether New York could grant property tax exemptions for religious
organizations.10 6 Benefits received by the religious organizations
required no "sustained and detailed administrative relationships" to
ensure compliance with the statute. 1 7 The nature of this type of aid
contrasts with direct grants to religious organizations that result in
administrative relationships requiring monitoring to prevent public aid
from being used for sectarian purposes.'
Hence, the third prong
emerged to prevent entwining relationships between government and
religion.
Various Supreme Court justices have expressed discontent with the
Lemon test."° Their frustration perhaps lies with the effects prong,
which requires distinguishing between government actions having the
primary effect of advancing religion, and those that do so only
residually." 0 Still, the Court continues to use the Lemon test."'

100. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
101. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
102. Id. at 205, 223.
103. Id. at 222.
104. The need for neutrality stems from history's lessons that strong sects could fuse
their power with the government's. Id.
105. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
106. Id. at 666-67.
107. Id. at 676.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating "I do not wish to be seen as advocating, let
alone adopting [Lemon] as our primary guide."); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In a general attack on the U.S. Supreme Court's
misunderstanding of the meaning of the Establishment Clause,Justice Rehnquist stated
that the "Lemon test has no more grounding in the history of the First Amendment than
does the wall theory upon which it rests." Id.
110. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 14-10, at 1215 (2d
ed. 1988) (stating that the Court bases its analysis of the effects prong on a "metaphysical distinction between direct and immediate effects on the one hand and effects
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Therefore, the Lemon test, or a test relying on cases applying it, would
likely serve as the test under which school vouchers will be scrutinized."' For this reason, an analysis of the Court's applications of
the Lemon test is needed to determine how school voucher legislation
including parochial schools would fare under Establishment Clause
scrutiny.
1.

The FirstProng: Secular or Sectarian Interest

School aid cases do not often result in disputes over whether
legislation has a secular purpose." 3 A very secular motive, improving
education, predominantly drives school funding increases. 4 Moreover, the Court is reluctant to ascribe an unconstitutional motive to
legislation."' For this reason, only in egregious situations where the
statute's alleged secular purpose is a "sham" will the Court strike it
down as unconstitutional for having the purpose of promoting
religion.171 6 As a result, the Court devotes little time to analyzing this
prong.'

2. The Second Prong: Primary Effects
Lemon's second prong seeks to ensure governmental programs

deemed indirect and incidental on the other.").
111. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2465 (1993)
(applying Lemon).
112. See id.; Heise, supra note 66, at 143 (stating that Zobrest showed the Court had
not abandoned Lemon for examining the constitutionality of school aid cases).
113. School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985) (stating that
"[a]s has often between true in school aid cases, there is no dispute as to the first
test."); see Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (stating that "[u]nder our prior
decisions, governmental assistance programs have consistently survived this inquiry even
when they have run afoul of other aspects of the Lemon framework.").
114. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 395 (noting the many important reasons for spending
public money on education).
115. Id. at 394-95 (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court is reluctant to attribute
.unconstitutional motives to the States," especially when a viable secular purpose for the
state's legislation can be gleaned from the face of the statute).
116. Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985). For an example of a fairly obvious
legislative attempt to promote religion, see Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 101 (1980)
(striking down a Kentucky law that permitted schools to post the ten commandments
in school hallways even though the statute stated a secular purpose).
117. See, e.g., Zobrest4 113 S. Ct. at 2465 n.4 (Respondents conceded statute providing
interpreters for hearing impaired persons had a secular purpose); Witters v. Washington
Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485 (1986) (holding that a statute granting
aid to visually impaired persons had a secular purpose). See generally Futterman, supra
note 7, at 726 (stating that "no law providing public aid to religious schools has been
invalidated on the secular purpose prong of Lemon.").
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remain neutral with respect to religion."' Federal and state governments are not permitted to allocate funds in a manner that will result
in a "direct subsidy" to sectarian schools." 9 Even funds that do not
flow directly to religious schools may have the effect of a direct subsidy
despite being distributed to students or parents."2 Conversely, the
Establishment Clause is not violated each time funds initially held by
the state find their way into the hands of religious institutions. 12' For
example, no violation occurs 1when
a state employee donates part or all
2
of her paycheck to a church.
The effects prong is the most important element of the Lemon test.
It is also the most difficult to analyze. Therefore, a survey of the
Court's prior cases involving school aid sheds light on how the Court
would apply the second prong of Lemon to school voucher programs
including parochial schools.
a. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist
In Nyquist,123 the Court determined whether amendments to New
York's tax laws designed to help children in nonpublic schools violated
the Establishment Clause. 2 4 The first tax provision provided direct
money grants to private schools for the purposes of maintaining and
repairing school facilities and equipment.'2 5 The second program
allowed parents with low incomes to receive reimbursements for private
school tuition. '2 The third program allowed parents not entitled to
tuition reimbursements to deduct amounts spent on their children's
private school tuition from their taxable income. 27 Each of these
programs was found to have the effect of promoting religion and
therefore were found unconstitutional.
After examining the first program, the Court concluded that there
was no way to ensure the direct money grants to the predominantly

118. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466; see also Grand Rapids Sch. Dist., 473 U.S. at 382
(finding government aid may not have the "effect of promoting a singular religion, or
religion generally"); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973)
(stating that governments should refrain from advancing or inhibiting religion and
instead be neutral toward religion).
119. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 486.
122. Id. at 487.
123. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
124. Nyquist 413 U.S. at 759.
125. The grants were directed at qualifying nonpublic, nonprofit schools serving lowincome students. Id. at 762-63.
126. Id. at 764.
127. Id.
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Roman Catholic schools went to secular purposes. 128 Without
restrictions on the uses of the funding and some way to ensure the
restrictions were complied with, the aid effectively directly subsidized
religion. 1" The Court applied the same reasoning when striking
down the tuition reimbursement" 3 and tax deduction programs.13 1
The state argued that the tax programs removed the state's ability to
direct funds to private schools because it was parents' decisions to send
their children to parochial schools that allowed those schools to receive
public funds. 1 2 Thus, contended the state, the tax statutes were
constitutional because the states' actions did not determine whether
The Court, however,
sectarian schools received state funds.135
indicated that intervening parental choice was just one of many factors
necessary to determine whether funds have the effect of promoting
religion."s In cases where the Court permitted public aid to flow to
parents with parochial school children, there was no threat that public
funds could be used for sectarian purposes:3 5 that threat could not
be suppressed in Nyquist. Furthermore, the statutes' benefits were
available only to parents with children attending private schools,
statutes allowed all parents to avail
whereas constitutionally-permissible
3 6
state benefits.

b. Mueller v. Allen
A decade after Nyquist, the Court confronted a similar tax scheme in
Mueller v. Alln 1 7 At issue were Minnesota laws allowing state

128. Id. at 775.
129. "Nothing in the statute... bars a qualifying school from paying out of state
funds the salaries of employees who maintain the school chapel." Id. Thus, the Court
stated that it could not be denied that the statute has the primary effect of advancing
religion. Id.
130. Id. at 780-89.
131. Id. at 791.
132. Id. at 781.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.; Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1946). In Everson, the Court upheld
a NewJersey statute permitting parents of school children attending parochial schools
to use buses funded by the state. The Court found that the state contributed no money
to the parochial schools and did not support them. Id. at 18. It merely enabled
children to reach their schools safely, regardless of their religion. Id.; see also Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). In AL/en, the Court did not find the second prong
of Lemon violated when the state of New York lent secular textbooks to children
attending public or private schools. Id. The government benefits conferred in Allen
and Everson had no sectarian characteristics and could not be put to secular uses.
136. Nyquist 413 U.S. at 782 n.38. In Alen and Everson, tax exemptions were
provided to all parents, not just those with students attending private schools. Id.
137. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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taxpayers to deduct from their taxable income expenses for their
children's tuition, textbooks, and transportation." s Those deductions were available to parents with children attending parochial
schools. Initially, the Court explained that Minnesota's tax scheme
included many deductions and therefore warranted the Court's
deference." 9 The Court's decision, however, turned on two other
considerations. First, and most significantly, the exemptions were
available to all parents.' In Nyquist, the only beneficiaries of the tax
statutes were parents whose children attended private schools.'41
Conversely, Minnesota's statute permitted parents to take deductions
whether their children attended public or private schools. 4 ' Also
important to the Court was the fact that "numerous private choices" of
parents directed the funds to parochial schools.
Only after parents
decided to send their children to parochial schools did public funds
reach religion.'
Therefore, the tax deduction created a constitu45
tionally-permissible "attenuated benefit" to parochial schools.
m '6
Thus, it passed the effects prong of Lemon
The Nyquist Court did not decide whether tax deductions could be
taken by parents with children in parochial schools; thus, the distinctions drawn by the Mueler Court between the statutes in Nyquist and
Mueller rested on valid structural differences. 147 The actual effects of

138. Id. at 396 (discussing MINN. STAT. § 290.09, subd. 10 (1933) (repealed 1987),
which permitted deductions for medical expenses, and MINN. STAT. § 290.21, subd. 3
(1933) (repealed 1987), which allowed deductions for charitable contributions).
139. Id. The many available deductions were, according to the Court, an "essential
feature" of Minnesota's tax scheme. Id. Moreover, legislatures' creation of tax
classifications are traditionally treated with deference. See Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83,
88 (1940) (acknowledging legislators' ability to "achieve an equitable distribution of the
tax burden" because they have "familiarity with local conditions"). Considering the size
of the legislation when analyzing whether it aids religion illogically implies that the
larger the tax legislation, the less important concerns over provisions in the legislation
that advance religion become. See Weishaar, supra note 1, at 552 n.79. If the court's
logic were followed, Legislatures could "bury" religious funding provisions in massive
tax bills without being concerned about Establishment Clause implications.
140. Mueer, 463 U.S. at 397.
141. Id.; see supra note 135 and accompanying text.
142. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398.
143. Id. at 399.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 400.
146. "Where, as here, aid to parochial schools is available only as a result of
decisions of individual parents no 'imprimatur of state approval' can be deemed to have
been conferred on any particular religion, or on religion generally." Id. at 399
(citations omitted).
147. In Nyquis, the Court found the statute in question not to be a genuine tax
deduction. Nyquis, 413 U.S. at 790 n.49. Therefore, the Court did not rule if tax
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the statutes, however, were virtually identical."4

Though Mueller

purportedly allowed all parents to take deductions,149 only those with
children in private schools could reap the statute's benefits.150 In
Therefore, parents
contrast, Minnesota's public schools are free."5
with children in public schools could make no textbook, tuition, or
transportation deductions. Consequently, the statutes did not benefit
them. Along a concomitant vein, parochial schools benefitted
disproportionately from the deductions. They become less expensive
for parents and thus draw more demand.1 52 Conversely, this tax
scheme relieved public schools of no expenses. Thus, the benefits
conferred by Minnesota's tax deductions were limited to parents and
the private schools their children attend. 5 The Court's distinction
54
between Mueller and Nyquist rested in form, not substance.
Mueller signaled a significant shifting of the Court's analysis of
Lemon's effects prong in school aid cases. The effects of the statutes in
Mueller and Nyquist were indistinguishable, yet the Court's interpreta-

deductions could constitutionally be applied to private schools. Id.
148. In fact, the Court itself admitted that the statutes rendered unconstitutional in
Nyquist and those upheld in Mueller "may be difficult to distinguish." Mueller, 463 U.S.
at 397 n.6.
149. The majority found that tax deductions, available to all parents, were "vitally
different" from Nyquist, which considered tax credits. Id. at 398. As Justice Marshall's
dissent states, "this is a distinction without a difference." Id. at 411 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Each has the same effect. See id. at 412.
150. The petitioners in Mueller contended most public school children had no
tuition expenses. Id. at 401. Furthermore, they presented evidence demonstrating that
96% of children in private schools in 1978-79 went to sectarian schools. Rebuking the
petitioners, the Court said it would be "loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to which various
classes of private citizens claimed benefits under this law." Id.; cf.Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 275 (1981) (stating neutral government actions can be constitutionally
impermissible when empirical evidence shows that religious groups will "dominate");
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973) (stating that religious classes cannot be
singled out for economic benefit).
151. MINN. STAT. § 120.06, subd. 1 (1982) ("Admission to a public school... is free
to any person who resides within the district which operates the school, who is under
21 years of age, and who satisfies the minimum age requirements imposed by this
section.").
152. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 411.
153. The Court rendered the statute's actual effect "irrelevant" and instead only
examined the statute's "theoretical impact." David Schimmel, Education, Religion, and
the Rehnquist Court: Demolishing the Wall of Separation, 56 EDuc. L. REP. 9, 11 (1989).
Thus, the Mueller Court eviscerated the true purpose of the "effects" prong: preventing
public funds to finance religion. Id.
154. The Minnesota law "is little more than a subsidy of tuition masquerading as a
subsidy of general educational expenses." Mueller, 463 U.S. at 408, 409 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). In both Nyquist and Mueller, the only real beneficiaries of tuition and textbook deductions were parents who sent their children to private schools. Id. at 408.
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don yielded opposing decisions.'55 The following opinions demonstrate that the Court's relaxed application of Lemon allows statutes to
provide substantial aid to religion provided they indirectly benefit
classes purportedly undefined by sectarian interests.
c.

Witters v. Washington Department
of Services for the Blind
In Witters, 56 the Court determined whether a visually-impaired
person's reception of state aid precluded the student's attendance at
a religious school.157 The statute first delivered aid to the visuallyimpaired student; in turn, the student chose to attend a bible
college.158 Like Mueller,159 students could avail the statute's benefits
regardless of whether they attended public, private, or parochial
schools. Thus, according to the Court, students had no incentive to
enroll in sectarian schools."W Moreover, the available aid flowed to
religious institutions only after aid recipients made "independent" and
"private choices" to attend religiously-affiliated schools. 6' Consequently, following the Mueller Court's reasoning, 62 the "effects"
prong was
not breached when the student used the funds at religious
63
schools.

155. Compare the Court's composition in Nyquist with its composition in Mueller.
The ideological leanings of the Justices likely influenced the differing results. When the
Mueller decision was handed downJustice Stewart, who voted with the Nyquist majority,
was no longer on the bench. By 1983, moderately conservative Justice O'Connor had
joined the bench and voted with the Muelr majority. Justice Powell, who wrote the
majority opinion in Nyquist, also voted with the majority in Mueller. Justices Marshall,
Burger, Brennan, Rehnquist, and White sat on the bench when both decisions were
handed down. Their votes in Mueller were consistent with their positions in NyquiAt.
156. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
157. Id. at 483 (citing WASH. REV.CODE § 74.16.181 (1981), which authorized a state
commission to "[p]rovide for special education and/or training in the professions,
business or trades," thereby enabling visually impaired persons to become self
sufficient).
158. Id. at 487.
159. Though the opinion did not explicitly rely on Mueller, it applied Muells
analytical framework. See id. at 490 (Powell, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 488.
161. Id. at 487.
162. In one sense, the statutes in Mueller and Wters functioned differently. Under
the statute in Wiuters, government benefits are available to the student no matter where
he or she attends school. Id. By contrast, government aid in Muellerwas not triggered
until the student attended a private school. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying
text.
163. Witters, 474 U.S. at 489.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol22/iss3/3

24

1996]

Nasstrom: School Vouchers SCHOOL
in Minnesota:
Confronting the Walls Separating Ch
VOUCHERS

1089

d. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District
Zobrest'P represents the most recent case in which the Court has
analyzed whether public funds unconstitutionally reached religious
institutions. The Zobrest Court ascertained whether a student could be
denied use of a state-provided hearing interpreter because he attended
classes at a Roman Catholic High School. 65 Again, the Court
followed Muelleis path."
In overruling the Arizona Supreme
Court's determination that this resulted in an Establishment Clause
violation, the Court first emphasized that the statute conferred benefits
to a class of persons undefined by religious beliefs. 167 Furthermore,
intervening choices guided the funds to sectarian schools."ta As a
result, the decision to aid parochial schools could not be linked to the
state. 69 Consequently, the effects prong of Lemon was not derogated:
in the Court's eyes, children, not religion, were the primary beneficiaries of governmental funds. 7
3. The Third Prong:Excessive Entanglement
The "excessive entanglement" prong poses two considerations for the
Court. First, a statute must not result in administrative entanglements
between church and state. Administrative entanglement exists when
the statute would require "comprehensive, discriminating, and
continuing state surveillance."'
Second, the statute must not
promote political divisiveness. 72 Political divisiveness occurs when
the government's involvement in religion is so pervasive that it risks
stirring "strife" and "strain" among religious sects.173 The Court has
provided little insight into when the excessive entanglement prong has
been violated, 74 conceding that its examination requires an "elusive

164. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
165. Id. at 2464. The statutes at issue were the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1988), and ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-761

(1991 & Supp. 1992).
166.
167.
receive
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Zobres 113 S. Ct. at 2463.
Id. at 2467 (noting that the IDEA allows any qualifying "handicapped" child to
benefits).
Id. at 2467-68.
Id.
Id. at 2469.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
Id. at 622.

173. Nyquis4 413 U.S. at 755; see also id. at 755 n.54 (quoting Freund, Comment,
Public Aid to ParochialSchools, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1680, 1692 (1969): "[p] olitical division
along religious lines is one of the principal evils that the First Amendment sought to
forestall").
174. Weishaar, supra note 1, at 568.
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inquiry.""7 5 Recent Court decisions have omitted altogether any
discussion of excessive entanglement. 7 6 Therefore, it is unclear if
analysis of the "excessive entanglement" prong continues serving as an
important component of Lemon. Though its omission from recent
Court decisions may have diminished its importance, the excessive
entanglement prong is well grounded in Court precedent.' 77 Thus,
the Lemon test should be examined when exploring the constitutionality of school voucher legislation.
a. Administrative Entanglement
The Lemon Court examined statutes permitting Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island to provide reimbursement to parochial schools for
teachers' salaries, textbooks, and other materials used for secular
educational purposes. 78 Finding the entanglement prong violated,
the Court indicated that ensuring the funds were used for secular
purposes required an impermissible level of governmental intrusiveness.1'
Distinguishing benefits along secular and sectarian lines
would necessitate a level of state inspection "fraught with the sort of
entanglement that the Constitution forbids." 80
By contrast, the Mueller Court found no entanglement where parents
of children in parochial schools took tax deductions for secular
textbooks, tuition, and transportation costs. 8 ' Determining whether
books were secular or not had been allowed in previous cases. 8 '
But, Justice Marshall's dissent countered that there was no way to
ensure the aid conferred from tuition reimbursements went exclusively
to secular interests.'
In his view, Minnesota's tax statutes were
nothing more than taxpayer financing of parochial education."
Mueller illustrates that the Court will require no effort to separate funds
along secular and sectarian uses when the aid received by parochial
175. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403 n.ll.
176. See, e.g., Zobrest 113 S. Ct. 2462 (containing no discussion of the excessive
entanglement prong in the majority's opinion); Witters, 474 U.S. at 487 n.5.
177. See, e.g., Mueler, 463 U.S. at 403; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 794; Lemon, 403 U.S. at
620.
178. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607, 609.
179. Id. at 620.
180. Id.
181. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403 (discussing MINN. STAT. § 290.09, subd. 22 (1982)
(repealed 1987)).
182. Id. (citing Board ofEduc. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975)).
183. Id. at 407 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Financial assistance for tuition payments,
even though indirect, is impermissible because there is no way to be sure the aid does
not benefit religion. Id. (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613).
184. Id. Because taxpayers end up financing parochial education, the tax deduction
creates an incentive for parents to send their children to religious schools.
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schools is deemed indirect.' s5 Consequently, the administrative
entanglement prong is eviscerated when school aid flows to parochial
schools in a manner consistent with Mueller.
b.

PoliticalDivisiveness

In Nyquist, the Court found that statutes providing parochial schools
with maintenance and tuition grants, along with tax deductions were
likely to cause political divisiveness.'1 6 The Court reasoned that the
programs would require continual re-examination and funding
increases each year.187 Once this occurs, political constituents
distinguished by religion would grow and become more aggressive in
pursuing further governmental aid, thereby increasing the potential for
political strife caused by allegations of religious favoritism toward
particular sects."t To prevent this, the Court must carefully scrutinize aid programs benefitting parochial schools."l 9 Although given
strong consideration, political divisiveness standing alone will not
convince the Court to hold laws unconstitutional."9 Furthermore,
the political divisiveness prong's application is limited to programs
conferring direct aid to parochial schools or parochial school
teachers.1 9' Thus, the Court would probably forgo a political divisiveness inquiry in cases where neutrally-offered statutes confer indirect aid
to parochial schools.
4.

The CurrentStatus of Lemon

The Court's analysis of statutes conferring aid to parochial schools
pivots on the effects prong. First, however, the Court gives a cursory
analysis to the act's purpose. Moving to the second prong, the Court
determines whether the government's actions are neutrally offered to
groups undefined by religious beliefs. Then it looks to see if intervening choices are responsible for government aid reaching religion. If
these examinations are answered affirmatively, the second prong of
Lemon is passed. From here, the Court can subject the statute to an
entanglement prong inquiry. As the Court's recent holdings suggest,
this examination is unlikely to occur where a statute is neutral toward

185. See Futterman, supra note 7, at 724 (suggesting Rehnquist's opinion in Mueller
abandoned the entanglement prong).
186. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 796.
187. Id. at 796-97 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623).
188. Id. at 796.
189. Id. at 798.
190. Id. at 798-99.
191. Mueller, at 403 n.l1 (stating that cases regarding political divisiveness must be
"confined to cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to
teachers in parochial schools.").
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religion and confers benefits to religion indirectly. The following
analysis illustrates how school vouchers including parochial schools
would fare under U.S. Supreme Court scrutiny.
B.

Applying Lemon to School Vouchers

Analysis shows that the U.S. Supreme Court's current construction
and application of Lemon to voucher legislation permitting parochial
schools' participation would not result in an Establishment Clause
violation.
1.

School Vouchers Under the First Prong

Finding a secular purpose in a school voucher program that allows
sectarian schools to participate would pose no difficulties for the
Court. 9 ' The theories underlying school vouchers do not include
proselytizing school children."' Universally, school voucher legislation envisions improving education through parental choice and
increased competition among schools." 9 The legislation introduced
into Minnesota's Legislature reflects these goals. 95 Therefore, little
evidence suggests the majority of voucher proponents seek voucher
legislation for its proclivities to forward sectarian purposes. Had
Governor Carlson's proposal succeeded, U.S. Supreme Court analysis
would almost certainly find the first prong of Lemon not violated.'9 6
2.

School Vouchers Under the Second Prong

The constitutionality of school voucher legislation permitting
parochial schools' participation hinges on the Court's application of
the effects prong. Muellerand following cases establish that two factors
of the effects prong will be pivotal if the Court examines school
vouchers. First, voucher legislation will have to be neutrally provided.
Then, private choices, and not the government's, must direct the aid
to religion.

192. Stick, supra note 64, at 434. Contra RobertJ. Bruno, ConstitutionalAnalysis of
Educational Vouchers in Minnesota, 53 EDuc. L. REP. 9, 12 (1989) (arguing that a voucher
bill introduced in the Minnesota legislature designed to "facilitate education choice for

pupils and their parents" had the real purpose of directing public money to religious
schools).
193. See supra notes 18-31 and accompanying text (discussing the theoretical

underpinnings of school vouchers, which included granting parents the freedom to
select schools for their children and increasing competition among schools).
194. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
195. H.R. 2651, 79th Leg., 1st Sess., § 7, subd. 2, Minn. (1996) (discussing the
purposes of school voucher legislation).
196. See Weishaar, supra note 1, at 581 (suggesting that school voucher legislation's
constitutionality would not turn on the Court's analysis of the Lemon test's first prong).
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The Neutrality of Voucher Legislation

To deem school voucher legislation neutrally offered, it must be
available to a class of beneficiaries undefined by religious persuasions197 Initially, Governor Carlson's proposal would have granted
vouchers to lower or middle income parents. 98 As a result, the
benefactors of vouchers would be parents who qualified because they
met the requisite income criteria. Absent from the legislation's criteria
were requirements of religious adherence. Following Muelleis trail,
this classification would meet no constitutional resistance from the U.S.
Supreme Court. The Court consistently states that when neutrally
offered, a statute which permits aid to eventually fall into the hands of
religious institutions suggests no governmental establishment of
religion."9
This response would unlikely vary if the Court were
confronted with voucher legislation including parochial schools.
As in Mueller, however, persuasive arguments could be made that the
statute is not in fact neutral. Public schools are available to all
students. And in Minnesota, parents have the option of sending their
child to any public school in or out of their residence's school
district. 00 Thus, vouchers offer few benefits to parents wishing to
send their children to public schools. 0 1 By contrast, parents sending
their children to private schools, which are predominately sectarian,
benefit significantly from vouchers. Parents are free to spend more of
their income on tuition. Consequently, religious schools benefit
because their relative cost decreases.0 2 From this perspective, only
those attending parochial schools, and the parochial schools themselves, benefit from voucher legislation. Moreover, unlike the aid given
to disabled students in Witters and Zobrest, only when parents send their
children to private schools do vouchers trigger benefits to parents. In
Minnesota's case, this almost always means sending children to
parochial schools. 203 Thus, the statutes' benefits would be conferred
almost exclusively on parochial schools and their students' parents.
Arguing vouchers are not neutrally offered would not likely succeed.
In theory, vouchers benefit a class distinguished on income, not

197. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 488-89.
198. "The student's income must not be more than 275 percent of the federal
poverty level." H.R. 2651, 79th Leg., 1st Sess., § 7 subd. 4, Minn. (1996).
199. Zobrest 113 S. Ct. at 2466; Muefler, 463 U.S. at 400.
200. See MINN. STAT. § 123.76 (1994).
201. This argument can be made, but parents at least receive the choice of having
private tuition reduced. Futterman, supra note 7, at 728-29.
202. See id. at 728. Vouchers clearly make parochial schools more affordable. Thus,
parochial schools would be far more competitive with public schools under a voucher

program. Id.
203. See supra note 86 (discussing the number of religiously affiliated schools).
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In this respect, the class of beneficiaries mirrors

the class that the Court found acceptable in Mueller. As with Mueller,
the only true beneficiaries of school vouchers are parents who send
their children to private schools, which are almost always parochial.20 5 Because this fact was unpersuasive to the Mueller Court, it
would also be unavailing should the Court examine school vouchers.
Therefore, the Court would find voucher legislation including
parochial schools to be neutrally offered. °6
b.

Incidental and Indirect Benefits of School Vouchers

For vouchers to confer incidental and indirect benefits to religion,
independent choices must direct the vouchers to parochial institutions.2° 7 Stated differently, it must be shown that, but for personal
and independent choices of private persons, no aid would flow to
religious institutions. 20 8 Most voucher plans envision granting parents
vouchers that can be delivered to any school parents deem worthy.
Parochial schools, therefore, will receive vouchers, and thus public
funds, only when parental choice permits. Recent Court analysis
indicates this type of financial transfer facilitated by school vouchers
would be permissible under the Establishment Clause.2°
In a
footnote stirring much attention, the Zobrest Court stated that it was
undeniable that when public funds went directly to parents whose
private choices directed it toward religion no Establishment Clause
violation resulted. 0 Commentators speculate that this statement
indicates the Court's willingness to find school voucher legislation
including parochial schools constitutionally acceptable.
Vouchers, though provided initially to parents, have an economic
impact on private schools no different than a direct subsidy. Conceding this is true with tax deductions for parents with children in private

204. See Futterman, supra note 7, at 729. Voucher legislation would be "at least
nominally available to all students" even though parents sending their children to
public schools gain nothing from vouchers. Id.
205. See Weishaar, supra note 1, at 563 (participating in a voucher program would
in reality be possible only if the parents sent their children to private schools).
206. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401.
207. Id. at 400.
208. Zobres, 113 S. Ct. at 2467; Witters, 474 U.S. at 487.
209. See Zoborest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467; Witters, 474 U.S. at 487.
210. See Zobres, 113 S. Ct. at 2469 n.ll ("The respondent readily admits, as it must,
that there would be no problem under the Establishment Clause if the IDEA funds
instead went directly to James' parents, who, in turn, hired the interpreter themselves.").
211. See Heise, supra note 66, at 142 (stating that Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2469 n.11
stood for the proposition "that a well-crafted school voucher program would not conflict
with the First Amendment"). See also Kemerer, supra note 53, at 22.
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schools, the Mueller Court stated that "financial assistance provided to
parents ultimately has an economic effect comparable to that of aid
given directly to the schools attended by their children."2 12 With
vouchers it can be argued that parents are "mere conduits" of the state
21
for the purposes of funding religion.
Thus, the state is doing
2 14
indirectly what in cannot do directly.

Mueller and its progeny suggest this argument would fail. As the
Court found in Zobrest and Witters, when children, not sectarian schools,
are the primary beneficiaries of public aid, the state is not
impermissibly funding religion.21 ' This analysis would easily extend
to a voucher program. School vouchers aid children by providing
them with more educational opportunities. If the aid eventually falls
into religious institutions' hands, it does so residually. 16 This form
of state aid would not be found unconstitutional: 2 indirect
and
17
attenuated aid to religion facilitated by parental choice.
3.

School Vouchers Under the Third Prong

Whether the U.S. Supreme Court would even find an entanglement
prong analysis appropriate in analyzing school voucher legislation
including parochial schools is unclear.1 8 If it did, the Court would
conclude that the dangers of entanglement would not warrant finding
voucher legislation unconstitutional.
a.

Administrative Entanglement

Theoretically, school voucher legislation including parochial schools
would be hard pressed to overcome the administrative entanglement
prong.2 19 Because primary and secondary religious schools' overriding mission is instilling religious values in children, separating

212. Mueler, 463 U.S. at 399; see also Witters, 474 U.S. at 487 (stating that although
a state may not give direct aid to religion, "[a]id may have that effect even though it
takes the form of aid to students or parents").
213. See Bruno, supra note 192, at 17 (quoting NyquiA 413 U.S. at 786).
214. Weishaar, supra note 1, at 564.
215. Zobrest 113 S. Ct. at 2469; Wters, 474 U.S. at 489.
216. Cf Witters, 474 U.S. at 488. In Wters, the Court stated that "unrestricted aid,
if properly attributable to the state" violates the Establishment Clause. Id. at 481. The
aid to parochial schools under a voucher plan would be unrestricted. Once received,
there would likely be no limitations on how it is spent. However, the aid would not be
"properly attributable to the state." As with tax deductions, the Court would likely
attribute the aid received by parochial schools to parents making independent choices.
Id. at 489.
217. See Futterman, supra note 7, at 729.
218. See supranote 176 and accompanying text.
219. See Egle, supra note 23, at 485 (finding that the third prong of Lemon will be
the most difficult to overcome for school vouchers).
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vouchers' benefits along secular and sectarian lines would be nearly
impossible.2 ° After Mueller, this problem would be avoided, however.
The Court upheld Minnesota's tuition tax deduction statute without
requiring mechanisms that ensured the financial benefits received were
used for nonsectarian purposes.22 1 Seeing this, state legislatures quit
erecting monitoring systems to ensure public funds are used for only
secular purposes. 2 Financial aid conferred by tuition deductions
has a nearly identical effect to the benefits conferred by school
vouchers. As in Mueller, then, the Court would probably require no
safeguards to ensure the aid was spent exclusively on secular purposes.
Moreover, the Court's omissions of entanglement prong analyses in
Zobrest and Witters suggest that school vouchers may altogether avoid
subjection to an administrative entanglement prong analysis.
Consequently, whether applied or not, administrative entanglement
concerns would not prevent parochial schools from receiving state
funded vouchers. 2
Approaching the entanglement prong from a different direction
could present Free Exercise issues. 224 As Zobrest and Witters indicated,
incidental and indirect government aid received by parochial schools
is attributed to the aid's recipients. 225 If aid is attributed to private
persons under effects prong analysis, it would be inconsistent to
supervise the aid as if it were the government's own under an
entanglement prong analysis. The Constitution cannot mandate
supervision of the legitimacy of the use of religious funds flowing from
private individuals. A similar analysis could be applied to school
vouchers. If parochial schools receive public aid from vouchers as a
result of private and independent choices, the aid would be attributed
to parents. The Court could not order supervision of the parochial
schools because the aid vouchers offered in effect came from parents,
not the government. The entanglement prong evaporates once the
effects prong is surmounted.
b. PoliticalDivisiveness
Court
has stated that the principal purpose of the Religious
The

220. See Bruno, supra note 192, at 20.
221. See Mueler, 463 U.S. at 407 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
222. Futterman, supra note 7, at 730.
223. See id. (suggesting that the Muellrdecision indicates that government programs
aiding religion need not be supervised to ensure the benefits go exclusively to secular
interests).
224. "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
225. See supra part I11A2.c-d and accompanying text (discussing the nature of the
aid received by parochial schools).
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Clauses is to prevent "political division along religious lines." 226
Without question, school voucher legislation produces politicallycharged discourse. It could therefore be asserted that school vouchers'
contentiousness would result in a level of political divisiveness violative
of the Establishment Clause.22 7 However, the Court has stated that
political divisiveness inquiry is required only when public aid is directly
transmitted to parochial schools. a In all likelihood, the Court
would find that school vouchers benefit parochial schools only
incidentally and indirectly. As a result, no matter how heated debates
over vouchers become, striking school vouchers unconstitutional for
fomenting political divisiveness would require2 the Court take a very
dramatic turn in its analysis of the Lemon test.

1

4. School Vouchers: Passing the Lemon Test
Applying recent applications of Lemon to school voucher legislation
would result in vouchers being held constitutional.2 1 School vouchers have a secular purpose. Additionally, the Court would probably
find voucher legislation neutrally offered and conferring only indirect
benefits to parochial schools. Finally, school vouchers would not cause
excessive entanglement. Thus, the Lemon test would be passed by
school voucher legislation including parochial schools. 231

It is

possible, however, that school vouchers would be scrutinized under an
alternative test. Consequently, school voucher legislation should be
analyzed under these tests to determine if these tests would render
vouchers unconstitutional.
C. Beyond Lemon: Alternative Tests
1. The Endorsement Test
The endorsement test was enunciated in Justice O'Connor's

226. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
227. Bruno, supranote 192, at 24. Bruno suggests that because Catholics operate
most of Minnesota's private schools, a school voucher plan including parochial schools
would upset other sects because they would not proportionately benefit from the legislation. Id.

228. Supra note 189 and accompanying text.
229.

See Stick, supra note 64, at 453; Futterman, supra note 7, at 730.

230. See alsoFutterman, supranote 7, at 731 (stating school vouchers would pass the
Lemon test); Heise, supra note 66, at 143-44.
231. TRIBE, supra note 110, § 14-10 at 1223. The Wtters and Mueler -decisions
indicate a school voucher program would be upheld by the Court. If the program was
neutrally offered to a wide range of schools and funds received by religious schools were
first funnelled through parents, the establishment clause "probably would not stand as
an obstacle ..... Id.
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concurrence in Lynch v. Donnly.232 O'Connor first suggests that
establishment clause analysis should focus on whether the governmental actions convey a message of favor or approval toward religion. 5 3
Even if laws have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion,
they can pass constitutional muster if no message of endorsement or
Consequently,
disapproval is expressed by the government.1
analysis of the effects prong shifts toward examining the message
government communicates about religion, not the effects its actions
have on religion. 3 5 O'Connor's endorsement test also considers
entanglements between government and religion to be the other

principal threat to the Establishment Clause. 2s 6 If governmental
involvement with religion limits religious institutions' autonomy, or
grants religious institutions access to government that is unavailable to
non-practitioners, entanglement exists. 3 7 Under the endorsement
test, political divisiveness would remain non-dispositive when examining
the constitutionality of statutes benefitting religion. 2' Therefore, the
significance of O'Connor's endorsement test lies more in its proposed
alteration of Lemon's effects prong than its views on entanglement.
Application of the endorsement test was illustrated in Grand Rapids
School District v. BalL 2 9 In Ball the Grand Rapids School District
offered two programs 240 allowing public school employees to teach

232. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
233. Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Endorsement sends a message to
nonadherence that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and
an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.").
234. For example, O'Connor suggested that in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970) (allowing tax exemptions for religious institutions), the statute questioned had
an effect of advancing religion, yet, the Establishment Clause was not violated. Lynch,
465 U.S. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
235. In Lynch, the Court upheld the city of Pawtucket's display of a nativity scene on
municipal property. Id. at 687. O'Connor thought the Court's analysis should focus
on what the city wanted to convey by displaying the creche and what message the
creche's "audience" received. Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This question
invoked portions of the purpose and effects prong of Lemon. Id.
236. Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
237. Id. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
238. Id. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Political divisiveness may indicate
excessive entanglement, but ultimately, the Court should examine why the government
actions result in divisiveness, not the extent of divisiveness itself. Id.
239. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
240. Id. at 375-76. The Shared Time program permitted public school employees
to teach classes at non-public schools. Only students attending private schools could
attend the classes. The Community Education Program operated similarly, offering
classes to children as well as adults. Unlike the Shared Time program, however, it was
taught primarily by parochial school teachers. Id.
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2 41
supplemental classes at predominantly sectarian private schools.
Because the vast majority of the students attended parochial schools,
they would not be able to discern that the programs were government
offered and non-sectarian. 4 2 Governmental actions should not
suggest a close identity between church and state, according to the
Court.243 Invoking endorsement test analysis, the Court stated that
when this type of relation "conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval of religion, a core purpose of the Establishment Clause is
violated."2 " Finding this to be true with the school245district's programs, the Court invalidated both as unconstitutional.

2. The Coercion Test
The coercion test prevents the government from coercing citizens to
either support or reject religion. Justice Kennedy first announced the
coercion test in his dissent in Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh
ACLU 2 '
Three years later, writing for the majority in Lee v.
Weisman,247 Kennedy declared that holding an invocation and
convocation at high school ceremonies effectively compelled students
Because graduation ceremonies are so
to support religion. 24'
significant for students and their families, the students had no choice
but to endure religious exposure. 249 The school district argued that
the students had the option of not attending, but the Court disposed
of this argument, saying it merely presented a "formalistic," unviable
option. 2 "
According to Kennedy, the school district's actions

241. Forty of the forty-one schools the programs operated at were religiously
affiliated. Id. at 379.
242. Id. at 388-89.
243. Id. at 389.
244. Id. at 398-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice
O'Connor distinguished the Shared Time Program from the Community Education
Program. Because the Shared Time Program was taught by public school teachers, she
found no threat of proselytization, and thus no constitutional problems with it. She
concurred with respect to the Community Education Program, which was taught by
parochial school teachers. Id. Allowing parochial school teachers to teach secular
subjects at parochial schools, "has the perceived and actual effect of advancing the
religious aims of the church-related schools." Id. at 400.
245. Id. at 398 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
246. 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating "government may
not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise").
247. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
248. Id. at 592-93.
249. Id. at 593.
250. Id. After going to school for many years, students should have an opportunity
to share there achievements. More fundamentally, when a citizen's rights are violated,
it is the state's duty to refrain from acting. It is not the duty of the citizen to accommodate unconstitutional state activity. Id.
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in religious activity and were
coerced students into participating
2 51
therefore unconstitutional.
3. Status of the Endorsement and Coercion Tests
The Court adopted Justice O'Connor's endorsement test in Allegheny
County,252 where Justice Blackmun opined that the test was useful for

evaluating whether religious symbols, such as nativity scenes, promoted
religion.253 Yet the majority opinion did not indicate whether the
endorsement test should be used in school aid cases. 21 Moreover,
asking what the government endorses may be unanswerable when the
government's acts are noncommunicative, which is often the case with
school aid programs.255 The coercion test may be even less applicable to school funding cases. Justice Kennedy, who first enunciated the
test, appears to be its only supporter.25 6 Thus, it is unlikely that the
endorsement or coercion tests would be applied to school voucher
legislation. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to provide a brief analysis of
how these two tests would measure school voucher legislation
permitting parochial schools to participate.
D. Applying the Endorsement and Coercion Tests to School Vouchers
1. The Endorsement Test and School Vouchers
To pass the endorsement test, school vouchers would have to avoid
sending either a message of governmental endorsement or condemnation of religion. This would be particularly true with children
benefitting under school voucher legislation. The Court recognizes
that young children may be influenced by a "symbolic union" between
church and state.257 Therefore, state actions that might lead children
to believe the state supports religion undergo taxing scrutiny.258 The

251. Id.
252. 492 U.S. 573.
253. Id. at 595.
254. Daniel, supra note 2, at 65 n.426.
255. For example, statutes allowing tax deductions for parents with children in
private schools, such as the case in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), support
religion, but they neither intend nor do they send a message endorsing religion. See
Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, And DoctrinalIllusions: Establishment Neutrality and
the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 288 n.92 (1987).
256. See Stick, supra note 64, at 454. It has been criticized as merely a restatement
of the principles set forth in the Free Exercise Clause, which states "Congress shall make
no law .. . prohibiting the free exercise" of religion, because the Free Exercise Clause
prohibits the government from coercing citizens to believe or disbelieve in religion. Id.
at 455.
257. Bag4 473 U.S. at 389, 390.
258. See, e.g., Balg 473 U.S. at 390 (noting children are more easily influenced by

governmental actions aiding the state); see also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-
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Court's desire to shield children from appearances of church and state
collaboration raises an interesting problem concerning school
vouchers. A child of parents with a modest income who once attended
public school might be curious as to why she can now attend a
parochial school. Upon learning that the government's school voucher
program enables this, would she infer that the state prefers children
attend parochial schools? Should the Court consider this, it might find
that in a child's mind, vouchers are supportive of religion. To a lesser
extent, parents and society may reach the same conclusion from school
voucher legislation including parochial schools. Nevertheless, the noncommunicative nature of school voucher legislation renders the
possibility of this result remote.5 9
Analysis of school vouchers' propensity to promote entanglement
26
under the endorsement test parallels an analysis under Lemon. 0
O'Connor voted with the Muelle's majority, which found no administrative entanglement concerns with tax deductions.2 6' This suggests
O'Connor would treat school vouchers similarly when applying the
entanglement portion of the endorsement test. Corresponding to the
political divisiveness component of Lemon, it could be argued that
certain faiths, such as Catholicism, would reap greater benefits from
voucher legislation than other religious groups. 2 62 O'Connor's
endorsement test, however, is not passed or failed according to the
political divisiveness stirred by government actions 2 61 Consequently,
school vouchers' failure to pass the endorsement test would require a
supplemental finding that voucher legislation sends a message that the
government supports religion. As this Article suggests, the Court
would not make such a finding. Therefore, the endorsement test's
entanglement concerns, as well as its communicative concerns, would
not result in an invalidation
of school voucher legislation including
26
parochial schools.

86 (1971) (discussing the different effects that public aid flowing to religion has on
college age students and those of younger years).
259. See supra notes 252-55 and accompanying text (discussing whether the
endorsement test can and would be applied to school voucher legislation).
260. For an analysis of the entanglement prong of Lemon, see supra notes 218-29 and
accompanying text.
261. Mue/er, 463 U.S. at 403.
262. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 796-98; see also Bruno, supra note 192, at 24 (indicating that
certain sects benefit more from voucher legislation than others).
263. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
264. See, e.g., Witters, 474 U.S. at 493 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Applying her
endorsement testJustice O'Connor found that the program granting state funds to the
visually impaired would have passed the endorsement test because no reasonable person
would infer that the state endorsed religion. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1996

37

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 3
12WLAM MiTCHELL LAW REVIEW

1102

[Vol. 22

The Coercion Test and School Vouchers

2.

School vouchers are intended to promote school choice; consequently, arguing vouchers coerce religious adherence requires making a
paradoxical assertion.2 ' An argument has been made that school
voucher legislation including parochial schools would be coercive
because parents would feel pressured into sending their children to
parochial schools. 2' For this argument to succeed, religious schools'
superiority would have to be conclusively established. 67 If this can
be proven, then it can be argued with equal force that better educational opportunities would be the factor coercing parents, not sectarian
curricula. School vouchers are intended to coerce parents into seeking
schools better equipped to educate their children. If the better
schools happen to be parochial, then religion becomes incidental to
the vouchers' ultimate aim. To the extent school vouchers possess
coercive powers, the coerciveness would be deemed secular. Therefore, the coercion test would not derail school voucher legislation
allowing parochial schools to participate.
School Voucher Legislation: Neither Endorsement Nor Coercion

3.

The endorsement and coercion tests have not served as the test for
determining whether legislation unconstitutionally allows public funds
to reach religious institutions. If either is applied, school voucher
legislation would most likely be found constitutional. The indirect
nature of the aid conferred by school vouchers suggests the Supreme
Court could not find such legislation to be an endorsement of religion.
Voucher legislation, designed to expand school choices, cannot be
seen as coercing citizens to support religion. Thus, the alternatives to
Lemon fail to strike down school voucher legislation which permits
religious schools to participate.
IV.

A.

SCHOOL VOUCHERS AND THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION

Introduction

The U.S. Supreme Court, applying any existing test, would find
school voucher legislation including sectarian schools permissible
under the Establishment Clause. Yet this does not mean school
vouchers will not establish religion. Before religious schools can
participate in a voucher program in Minnesota, they must not run

265.

Weishaar, supra note 1, at 571 (noting that "choice" and "coercion" are

antonyms).
266. Daniel, supra note 2, at 68.
267. Stick, supra note 64, at 454.
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afoul of the Minnesota Constitution. 68
B.

Religion and the States

The notion that church and state should not be intertwined
originated before the U.S. Constitution was ratified. 69 A number of
colonies had established religions; 70 however, many followed
Virginia's lead in dismantling state-instituted churches. 71 Still, it was
not until 1833 that Massachusetts disestablished the Congregationalist
Church as the official state religion. 72 In fact, the Establishment
Clause was not applied to state actions until 1947. Prior to being
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, the religion
.... clauses only
73
extended to the federal government's intrusion into religion.

Thus, if a citizen claimed excessive governmental involvement in
religion, he or she had to look to state constitutional provisions for
protection. 7 4 Often, states' establishment clauses are more prohibitive than their federal counterpart. 275 Coupled with state courts'
ability to interpret constitutional claims relying on independent state
constitutional grounds, states' constitutions can be read to impose

268. See generally Wtters, 474 U.S. at 481. After reversing the Washington Supreme
Court's determination that the U.S. Constitution's Establishment Clause did not permit
a visually-impaired person attending a religious school to receive state aid, the Court
said the Washington court was permitted to apply its more stringent constitution on
remand. Id. at 489. The Washington Supreme Court did so and again found it
unconstitutional for the student receiving public aid to attend a bible school. Witters
v. Washington Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Wash. 1989) (en banc).
269. James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessment and
Thomas Jefferson's Billfor EstablishingReligious Freedomwere bulwarks for those arguing
that the colonies, and later the states, should not establish religion. ROBERT L. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 4-5 (1982).
270. See generally LEONARD W. LEvY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, 1-16 (1986).
Anglicanism was the state-established religion in Virginia and other southern states. Id.
at 1. In New England, many of the colonies established Congregationalism as the official religion. Roman Catholics, Jews, Baptists and other sects were often prohibited
from practicing their religion. Id.
271. CORD, supra note 269, at 4. By the time the Constitutional Convention had
convened, the Anglican Church of Virginia had been disestablished. Id.
272. Id.
273. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In Everson, the Establishment
Clause was first applied to state actions. Id. at 15; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (stating that the religious clauses were incorporated by the 14th
amendment).
274. See TerrenceJ. Fleming &Jack Nordby, The Minnesota Bill of Rights: "Wrapt in
the Old Miasmal Mist," 7 HAMLINE L. REv. 51, 56 (1984) (discussing the lack of
immediate 14th amendment incorporation of various U.S. Constitution amendments).
275. See L.S.W, Beyond the Establishment Clause:Enforcing Separation of Church and State
Through State ConstitutionalProvisions,71 VA. L. REv. 625, 630-34 (1985) (discussing the
more restrictive nature of state establishment clauses compared to their federal

counterpart).
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more restrictive standards on state actions than the federal constitution. 276
The Establishment Clauses of the Minnesota Constitution
Traditionally, Minnesota courts have rarely extended the state's bill
of rights beyond the limits of protection provided by the federal Bill
of Rights.277 Minnesota's state constitutional counterpart to the
Establishment Clause has not been excepted from the Minnesota
Supreme Court's general practice of relying on the U.S. Constitution. 27 The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledges it can interpret
article I, section 16 of the Minnesota Constitution more expansively
than the U.S. Supreme Court interprets the Establishment Clause,279
yet it has not done so. 2tu Straying from the U.S. Supreme Court's
influence, the Minnesota Supreme Court has recently been inclined to
interpret Minnesota's Constitution as conferring more protection than
the U.S. Constitution. 281' The Minnesota Supreme Court has found
C.

276. Id. at 625. Because states can impose tighter restrictions on government
activities benefiting religion, state constitutions often pose more of a threat to
legislation than does the federal constitution. Id.; see aisoFleming & Nordby, supranote
274, at 57-59 (discussing state courts' ability to grant citizens greater protections under
the Minnesota Constitution than offered under the U.S. Constitution); cf. William J.
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489, 491 (1977) (indicating that state courts have a duty to apply state constitutions to
protect their citizens).
277. Fleming & Nordby, supranote 274, at 53-54. Although the Minnesota Supreme
Court often announces its ability to interpret the state bill of rights differently than the
Federal counterpart, it has yet to provide greater protection than the U.S. Constitution
offers. Id. (note: Fleming and Nordby wrote this article in 1984).
278. See id. at 66-67.
279. Americans United Inc. as Protestants United for Separation of Church and
State v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 622, 288 Minn. 196, 201, 179 N.W.2d 146, 149
(1970) (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis of the First Amendment in
Everson provides "persuasive and distinguished precedent," but it is not binding
authority on how the Minnesota Constitution should be interpreted).
280. See Fleming & Nordby, supranote 274, at 58. The decisions of the Minnesota
court do not often rest exclusively on the Minnesota Bill of Rights. Id. Never has the
Minnesota court interpreted the Minnesota Bill of Rights in a manner that would
contradict U.S. Supreme Court findings. Id.
281. See, e.g., Ascher v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 185 (Minn.
1994); Gray v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1994). In Ascher
and Gray, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that random sobriety checkpoints were
unconstitutional. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444 (1990), had held that the federal constitution permitted such searches.
Even though article 1, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution is worded identically
to the Fourth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution, the Minnesota Supreme Court
exercised its ability to expand the protections of the state constitution beyond the
protections offered by the U.S. Constitution. Id.; see also State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d
886, 888 (Minn. 1991) (applying a stricter rational basis test for equal protection
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that Minnesota's Free Exercise Clause is more prohibitive than its
federal counterpart.2 82 This suggests that Minnesota's Supreme
Court may be willing to do the same with Minnesota's establishment
clauses.28 ' For the purposes of school voucher analysis, article XIII,
section 2 of the Minnesota Constitution, which prohibits the use of
public money or property for the support of
parochial schools, is the
284
more pertinent establishment amendment.
D.

The Minnesota Supreme Court and PublicAid to ParochialSchools
The Minnesota Supreme Court's willingness to extend state
constitutional protections beyond the point where the U.S. Supreme
Court interprets the U.S. Constitution threatens voucher legislation
including parochial schools. Even if the U.S. Supreme Court finds
state-funded school voucher programs constitutional, the Minnesota
Supreme Court could hold otherwise under Minnesota's Constitution.2 " Examining Minnesota's Supreme Court's scrutiny of state
legislation conferring aid to parochial schools casts light on whether
the school vouchers can avoid colliding with Minnesota's constitutional
barriers.

purposes than the U.S. Supreme Court applies).
282. Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 865
(Minn. 1992) (maintaining a more stringent test for determining when the state
infringes upon a person's free exercise rights than the U.S. Supreme Court utilized);
see also State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989), vacated and remanded, 495
U.S. 901, affld on remand, 462 N.W.2d 393 (1990) (en banc). In Hershberger,an Amish
person contested Minnesota Statutes section 169.552 as violating Minnesota's Free
Exercise Clause by compelling bright, reflective signs be put on slow moving vehicles.
Id. at 397. This requirement violated a tenet of the Amish religion. Deciding that the
Amish person's constitutional rights had been violated, the court noted that Minnesota's
Free Exercise Clause was "distinctly stronger" than its federal counterpart. Id.; see also
State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 11 (Minn. 1990) (holding that a landlord's free exercise
rights under Minnesota's constitution were violated when the Minnesota Human Rights
Department filed a complaint against the landlord for refusing to rent to an unmarried
couple). For a detailed discussion of Hershbergerand French, see generally, Rita Coyle
De Meulos, Minnesota's VariableApproach To State ConstitutionalClaims, 17 WM. MrrCHELL
L. REV. 163 (1991).
283. Minnesota Fed'n of Teachers v. Mammenga, 500 N.W.2d 136, 139 (Minn. Ct.
App.), rev. denied, (Minn. 1993) (stating the Minnesota Constitution has two establishment clauses).
284. See, e.g., Americans United, Inc. as Protestants and Other Amer. United for
Separation of Church and State v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 622, 288 Minn. 196, 201,
179 N.W.2d 146, 149 (1970) (applying article VIII, section 2 (now article XIII, section
2) to a statute allowing students attending parochial schools to ride publicly-funded
buses).
285. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (holding that when a state court
rules on "separate" and "independent" state constitutional grounds the Supreme Court
cannot attain jurisdiction over the case).
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1. Americans United, Inc. v. Independent
School District No. 622
In Americans United,86 the court upheld a state statute permitting
28 7

school children to ride publicly-funded buses to sectarian schools.

The court's opinion mirrored the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in
Everson v. Board of Education, which found that the Establishment
Clause was not violated when parochial school students were transported to schools on public school buses.288 Importantly, the court
conceded that it took less governmental activity to "support" religion
than to "establish" religion 2 9 thus acknowledging the independent
significance of Minnesota's establishment clauses.290 Despite providing parochial schools with some benefit, 29 ' the court found that the
benefits received by the parochial schools were merely "incidental" and
"indirect." 92 Parents and children, according to the court, were the
"primary beneficiaries" of the busing services. 93 Consequently,
religion was not deemed supported when parochial school students
rode publicly-funded buses. 294 Ending with a caveat, the court
indicated that its holding stood at the outer limits of constitutional-

286. 288 Minn. 196, 179 N.W.2d 146 (1970).
287. Id. at 217, 179 N.W.2d at 157. Minnesota Statutes section 123.76 allows "school
children attending any schools, complying with [Minnesota Statutes §] 120.10 [setting
forth compulsory attendance requirements, school year length, and other minimum
requirements set for all schools, public and private in Minnesota] to the same rights
and privileges relating to transportation." Id.; see also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 67 (1947) (finding the U.S. Constitution permitted NewJersey to allow children
attending sectarian schools to ride buses funded by the state).
288. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17. In Everson, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a New
Jersey statute that permitted parochial school children to ride publicly-funded buses.
Id. The Court also found that the statute did not "support" parochial schools when it
allowed parochial school children to ride public school buses. Id. at 18.
289. See Americans United, 288 Minn. at 201, 179 N.W.2d at 149. In making this
statement, the court conceded that Minnesota's establishment clauses, which both
prohibit support of religion, are more prohibitive than the U.S. Constitution, which
merely prevents the government from establishing religion. Id. For this reason, "a
more effective argument can be made" under Minnesota's Constitution. Id. Compare
MINN. CONsT. art. I, § 16 and MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 2 with U.S. CONST. amend I.
290. The court stated that Everson is "simply distinguished precedent" and that its
holding was "diluted" because of the different texts of the U.S. and Minnesota
Constitution. Americans United, 288 Minn. at 201, 179 N.W.2d at 149.
291. See id. at 210, 179 N.W.2d at 155.
292. Id. at 205, 179 N.W.2d at 151.
295. See id. The court described a number of state courts finding parochial school
children could constitutionally ride publicly-funded school buses because the aid
received by the schools was incidental and indirect. See id.
294. Id. at 210, 179 N.W.2d at 154.
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ity.

2.

Minnesota Higher Education
Facilities Authority v. Hawk

In Hawk,29 the Minnesota Supreme Court decided whether a state
agency could issue tax exempt revenue bonds to religiously-affiliated
colleges.297 The statute required that the schools using the bonds be
nonsectarian, 298 and it would not permit the bonds to be used for
financing sectarian investments in teaching or building construction. 2 9 First, the court found that because the state agency issuing
the bonds was funded entirely by fees from the schools receiving the
bonds, there was no state support of religion.'3 ° Thus, article XIII,
section 2 was inapplicable because it only applies when public funds
support religious schools. 01 Second, the Hawk court found the
schools receiving the funds were secular in nature.0 2 The statute was
upheld, but in dicta the court emphasized that allowing public aid to
reach religiously-affiliated post-secondary schools was far different than
3
permitting public aid to go to primary and secondary schools.1

295. The court declared that its decision went to the brink of constitutionality. Id.
Further, the Court opined that legislation allowing aid to flow to sectarian schools is
"today a trickling stream but may all too soon become a raging torrent." Id. (quoting
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963)).
296. 305 Minn. 97, 232 N.W.2d 106 (1975).
297. Id. at 100, 232 N.W.2d at 108. The colleges involved were St. Theresa's (now
defunct), St. Mary's, and Bethel College. Id.
298. Id. at 98, 232 N.W.2d at 107; see also MINN. STAT. § 136A.28(b) (1974) (stating
that the projects "shall not include any facility used or to be used for sectarian
instruction or as a place of religious worship nor any facility which is used or to be used
primarily in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of
divinity for any religious denomination.").
299. Id. at 98, 232 N.W.2d at 107; see also supra note 257.
300. Hawk, 305 Minn. at 104-07, 232 N.W.2d at 110-12. The Minnesota Higher
Education Authority merely issued the bonds. The state was not responsible for their
payment; this duty fell on the schools. Id. at 106, 232 N.W.2d at 111.
301. Id. at 107-08, 179 N.W.2d at 112; see also MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 2 ("In no
case shall any public money be appropriated or used ... for the support of schools
wherein the distinctive doctrines, creeds or tenets of any particular" religion are
promoted).
302. Hawk, 305 Minn. at 109-10, 232 N.W.2d at 113 (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672, 685 (1971)). College students are "less impressionable and less susceptible
to religious indoctrination." Also, "church-related" colleges permit and encourage
academic freedom and critical thought. For these reasons, the colleges are therefore
'secular in nature." Id. at 110, 232 N.W.2d at 113.
303. Id. at 110, 232 N.W.2d at 114 (stating "higher education is an entirely different
matter than aid to primary and secondary schools").
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3. The Mammenga Cases
In the Mammenga cases," the Minnesota Court of Appeals examined the constitutionality of Minnesota's Post Secondary Enrollment
Option Act (PSEOA).
The statute permits students in eleventh or
twelfth grade to take college courses; a portion of tuition is then
reimbursed by the state." 6 The statute was argued to be in violation
of Minnesota's establishment clauses because many of students
participating took courses at religiously-affiliated colleges."0 7 The
courts used a two-pronged test to ascertain the statute's effect on
religion.30 8 First, benefits received by schools promoting religious
doctrines must be "incidental" and "indirect."" Second, the court
must determine whether the school is "pervasively sectarian."'10
However, if the first prong is answered affirmatively, aid to the schools
does not impermissibly establish religion."1 ' This is true even if the
college is pervasively sectarian.312 The appellate court found that the
colleges received the aid as an "incidental and indirect result of the
individual choices of the beneficiaries."" i ' Additionally, despite the
colleges' religious affiliations, they were deemed nonsectarian. 14 As
a result, 15
religiously-affiliated colleges' participation in the PSEOA was
3
upheld.

304. Minnesota Fed'n of Teachers v. Mammenga, 485 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. CL App.),
rev. denied, (Minn. 1992) (Mammenga I) (remanding to trial court for factual finding of
whether Bethel College could participate in the Post Secondary Enrollment Options
Act); Minnesota Fed'n of Teachers v. Mammenga, 500 N.W.2d 136 (Minn. Ct. App.),
rev. denied (Minn. 1993) (Mammenga II) (finding Bethel College could participate in the
Post Secondary Enrollment Options Act).
305. MINN. STAT. § 128.3514, subd. 2 (1994).
306. MINN. STAT. § 123.3514, subd. 6 (1994).
307. Mammenga I, 485 N.W.2d at 306.
308. See Mammenga II, 500 N.W.2d. at 138.
309. Id. (citing Mammnga 1, 485 N.W.2d at 310).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. The appellate court listed a number of reasons why the first prong had not
been violated: 1) The PSEOA benefits high school students, not the schools they attend;
2) students may attend either public or private universities; 3) the tuition reimbursement applies only to secular classes 4) only a portion of the tuition expenses are paid
to the colleges by the state; and 5) PSEOA funds are separated from other funds to
ensure they are only used for secular purposes. Id.
313. Mammenga H, 500 N.W.2d at 138-39; Mammenga , 485 N.W.2d at 308.
314. Mammenga , 485 N.W.2d at 309 (citing Hawok, 305 Minn. 97, 98, 232 N.W.2d
106, 107 (1975)).
315. Mammenga HI,500 N.W.2d at 139; Mammenga , 485 N.W.2d at 309.
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E.

The Minnesota Supreme Court and School Vouchers
The Minnesota Court of Appeals' pronouncement of a two part test
in Mammenga provides a framework under which school vouchers can
be analyzed. Though only an intermediate appellate court decision,
the Mammenga court's test was deduced from the Minnesota Supreme
Court's holdings in Americans United and Hawk"1 6 Therefore, its
underpinnings provide a solid framework for analyzing the constitutionality of school vouchers. 17
1. Incidental and Indirect Aid
The court's holding in Americans United offers strong precedent
supporting school voucher advocates' position. Finding that the real
beneficiaries of the statute questioned were parents and children
establishes a strong foundation for school voucher advocates because
the same analysis can be applied to school vouchers. For parochial
schools to receive public funds through a school voucher program,
parents first must decide to send their children to a parochial
school."' i Only when this occurs do parochial schools accrue public
funds. Thus, school vouchers confer benefits on parochial schools
indirectly and incidentally.
Yet, in Americans United the court cautioned that its decision brought
it to the "brink of unconstitutionality."" 9 Allowing parochial school
children to ride publicly-funded buses does not approach conferring
the level of benefits that school vouchers would. Under a voucher
program, a whole stratum of children once unable to attend private
schools could now do so. Moreover, parochial schools' tuition costs
would be significantly defrayed by state funded vouchers. Consequently, though indirect and incidental, the benefits school vouchers would
deliver to parochial schools may be so significant that school voucher

316. See Mammenga /, 500 N.W.2d at 138.
317. While analyzing the incidental nature of the benefits conferred to religious
colleges in Mammenga, the court also noted that the PSEOA was neutrally offered.
Mammenga H, 500 N.W.2d at 139; Mammenga I, 485 N.W.2d at 308. Coupled with each
other, considerations of the statutes' neutral classifications and tendencies toward
providing merely incidental and indirect benefits bears strong resemblance to the U.S.
Supreme Court's framework for analyzing school aid legislation permitting parochial
schools to receive state support.
318. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. Under typical voucher plans, the
parents receive the voucher. Id. Thus, when parents choose to send their child to a
parochial school they are determining who receives financing, not the state. Id. But
see Bruno, supra note 192, at 13 (stating that the voucher "is nothing of value to the
parent except as a means of designating a state grant to a particular school.").
319. Americans United, 288 Minn. at 210, 179 N.W.2d at 154.
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legislation would go beyond Minnesota's constitutional brink. 20
The Mammenga decisions may encourage voucher advocates more
than American United. The Post Secondary Enrollment Option Program
upheld by the Minnesota Court of Appeals operates in a manner
identical to how a voucher program would function. After matriculating high school students, colleges and universities are reimbursed for
tuition by the state. 21 The secondary education students attended
religiously-affiliated schools, but the benefits realized by the religiously3 22
affiliated colleges were incidental and indirect.
Still, the Mammenga decisions were only rendered by the Minnesota
Court of Appeals. More importantly, the students availing themselves
of the statute's benefits could only be reimbursed for nonsectarian
coursework.3 2' Distinguishing between sectarian and nonsectarian
coursework in parochial schools would be impossible because
inculcating religious beliefs is an indelible part of the schools'
mission. 2 4' Therefore, even if aid flowing to religious schools is
incidental and indirect in the PSEOA, the court may be reluctant to
apply this reasoning to school voucher programs. The aid school
vouchers confer to primary and secondary parochial schools cannot be
separated along secular and sectarian uses because these schools'
primary mission is to inculcate religious adherence in children.
2. Pervasively Sectarian
According to Mammenga, if public aid flows to religion incidentally and indirectly, the statute questioned is still constitutional even if
the school receiving the aid is pervasively sectarian. Yet Mammenga
dealt exclusively with religiously-affiliated post-secondary schools.
School vouchers, on the other hand, emphasize aiding primary and
secondary schools. The Minnesota Supreme Court sees little possibility
320. In addressing concerns that upholding laws allowing parochial school children
to ride public school buses, the court in dicta took pains to limit its interpretation of

Minnesota's Constitution to the particular facts. See Americans United, 288 Minn. at 21113, 179 N.W.2d at 154-55. The court stated that direct aid to students in parochial
students may be unconstitutional and declared that it may be unable to draw a
distinction between direct and indirect aid. Id. at 213, 179 N.W.2d at 155.
321. In the PSEOA, the state reimburses colleges and universities for a percentage
of the tuition expenses participating students incur. MINN. STAT. § 123.3514, subd. 6
(1994).
322. Mammenga II, 500 N.W.2d at 139.
323. MINN. STAT. § 123.3514, subd. 2 (1994) (stating the program allows secondary
students to "enroll full time or part time in nonsectarian courses or programs").
324. Students at colleges and universities are old enough to think critically and
independently. See Minnesota Higher Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Hawk, 305 Minn. 97, 110,
232 N.W.2d 106, 113 (1975) (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685 (1971)).
Funding higher education, however, "is in an entirely different category than aid to
primary and secondary schools." Id. at 110, 232 N.W.2d at 114.
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of religious inculcation occurring in post-secondary education. By
contrast, the court is much more skeptical when public aid flows to
primary and secondary schools. Their primary mission is to "assure
future adherents to a particular faith by having control of the total
education at an early age." s" For this reason, parochial schools are
likely to be deemed predominantly sectarian. Nevertheless, this factor
alone would not render school vouchers unconstitutional if the
26
benefits accorded to parochial schools are incidental and indirect.
27
3. School Vouchers and the Mammenga TestP
The few cases interpreting Minnesota's establishment amendments
offer a glimpse of where school voucher legislation falls under

Mammenga's test.3 28

Supporting voucher passage is the similarity of

the Mammenga test to the current effects prong of Lemon. Both permit
incidental and indirect aid to flow to religion. Two factors weaken the
predictive value of Minnesota case law interpreting Minnesota's
establishment clauses: 1) The Minnesota Supreme Court cases are
dated and few in number; and 2) The court's decisions permitting aid
to flow to parochial schools considered statutes that would provide far
less aid than school vouchers. Relying on the analytical framework
gleaned from the Minnesota cases leaves much room for speculation
regarding the constitutionality of school vouchers.
Minnesota Constitutional Text: Snaring Vouchers?
Article XIII, section 2 of Minnesota's Constitution states that "In no
case shall any public money or property be appropriated or used for
the support of schools wherein the distinctive doctrines, creeds or
tenets of any particular Christian or other religious sect are promulgated or taught." Article I, section 16 states that no person can "be
compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to
maintain any religious or ecclesiastical ministry, against his consent."
Without question, the language of Minnesota's establishment clauses,
in particular article XIII, section 2, is stronger than the federal
constitution, which requires "Congress make no law respecting an
E

325. Id. at 110, 232 N.W.2d 106,113 (1975) (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 685 (1971)).
326. Mammenga Hf,500 N.W.2d at 138; see Americans United, 288 Minn. at 214-15, 179
N.W.2d at 156 (allowing children to attend sectarian schools to ride publicly-funded
buses because the benefits received by parochial schools was incidental and indirect).
327. See Mammenga II, 500 N.W.2d at 138.
328. See Mammenga , 485 N.W.2d at 307. The court noted that "twice during the
1970's" had the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted Minnesota's establishment
clauses. The court relied on Americans United and Hawk exclusively for analysis of
Minnesota's establishment clause. Id. at 308-09.
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establishment of religion."" It has been suggested that article XIII,
section 2 prevents even indirect aid from reaching parochial
schools." ° Minnesota's Supreme Court has recognized that showing
a statute supports religion is less burdensome than showing the statute
Consequently, if literally interpreted,
establishes religion. 3 '
Minnesota's establishment clauses would likely32render school vouchers
including parochial schools unconstitutional.
Buttressing this assertion are other state courts' analyses of similar
constitutional provisions. Initially snaring vouchers' implementation
were state constitutions finding that parochial schools could not receive
public support in the form of vouchers or tuition reductions."'
More recently, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court held that school
voucher legislation including private schools would unconstitutionally
"support" schools not operated by the state."3 4 In 1992, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court found that a school voucher program
allowing religious schools to participate would be unconstitutional.33 5
Like Minnesota's constitution, the New Hampshire Constitution
prohibits public funds from supporting sectarian schools.3 6 Similar-

329.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

330. Bruno, supra note 192, at 27. As one commentator notes, no "qualifier"
precedes the word "support" in the amendment. Bruno argues that this indicates the
Minnesota Constitution permits no support to parochial schools in any form. Id.
331. Americans United, 288 Minn. at 213, 179 N.W.2d at 155 ("We simply inject a
caveat that the limitations contained in the Minnesota Constitution are substantially
more restrictive than those imposed" by the Establishment Clause.).
332. See, e.g.,John PaulJones, Pennsylvania'sChoice: "School Choice"And Pennsylvania's
Constitution, 66 TEMP. L.Q. 1289, 1312 (1993) (examining whether sectarian schools
could receive publicly-funded school vouchers without running afoul of Pennsylvania's
establishment clause in article I, section 3, which states "no man can of right be
compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship.") As Jones states, there is
no textual basis for reading Pennsylvania's Constitution and the federal constitution in
identical fashion. Id.
333. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (describing Washington, Virginia
and Massachusetts' incipient school voucher programs that were found to impermissibly
aid religion). Interestingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court in its discussion of
Minnesota's stringent establishment clauses cited to the Opinion of the Justices of
Massachusetts case, which held a voucher like bill unconstitutional. See Americans
United.Inc., 288 Minn. at 212 n.5, 179 N.W.2d at 155 n.5.
334. Kemerer, supra note 53, at 31. In Puerto Rico, a publicly-funded voucher plan
allowing parochial schools to participate was enacted. After interpreting article II,
section 5 of Puerto Rico's Constitution, which states "[N]o public property or public
funds shall be used for the support of schools or education institutions other than those
of the state," the voucher legislation was found unconstitutional. This amendment was
found'to prohibit any benefits or support from reaching religious schools. Id.
335. Opinion of the Justices, 616 A.2d 478, 480 (N.H. 1992).
336. Id. The New Hampshire Supreme Court opined that a parental choice
program that permitted parochial schools to participate was unconstitutional. Id. It
based its ruling on an amendment very similar to article XIII, section 2 of the Minneso-
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ly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court advised the Massachusetts
Legislature that a tax deduction modeled after MueUer v. Allen would
not pass state constitutional muster because the language of the
Massachusetts constitution was much more "specific" than the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. a3 7 Another example of state
constitutions' prohibitive nature is article I, section 11 of Washington's
constitution, which declares "no public money or property shall
be

. .

. applied to ...

the support of any religious establishment. " '

Applying this amendment, Washington's Supreme Court affirmed its
decision in Witters on remand by the U.S. Supreme Court.339 These
cases show that textual differences in state constitutions, and the
stricter applications that logically follow, suggest school vouchers would
possibly meet a similar fate under Minnesota constitutional analySS340

Minnesota's Supreme Court has applied Minnesota's free exercise

341
clause in a manner that reflects the amendment's strong text.
This suggests the court may give similar treatment to Minnesota's
establishment clause. In State v. Hershberger, the court declared that
article I, section 16 was "distinctly stronger" than its federal counterpart. 342 The Mammenga court contended that this statement merely

Compare MINN. CONST. arL XI11, § 2 with N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 6
(stating that "no person shall ever be compelled to pay towards the support of the
schools of any sect or denomination.").
337. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 514 N.E.2d 353, 354 n.4 (Mass. 1987)
(referring to article 46, section 2 of the Massachusetts Constitution, which prohibits a
.grant, appropriation or use of public money.., for founding, maintaining or aiding"
religious schools). The court stated that despite who receives the aid first, "the focus
still is on the effect of the aid, not on the recipient." Id. at 356.
338. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
339. Witters v. State Comm'n For The Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Wash. 1989).
"Here, the applicant is asking for the State to pay for a religious course of study at a
religious school, with a religious career as his goal. This falls precisely within the clear
language of the state constitution again prohibition against applying public moneys to
any religious instruction." Id.
340. See Kemerer, supra note 53, at 24. Many states' establishment clauses are
stronger than the federal establishment clause and pose a more significant threat to
school voucher programs that include parochial schools. Id. at 24 n.29; Jonathan B.
Cleveland, School Choice: American Elementay and Secondary Education Enter the "Adapt or
Die" Environment of a Competitive Marketplace, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 75, 139 (1995)
(stating state constitutions may demand a strict separation of church and state).
341. See supra note 282 (discussing the Minnesota Supreme Court's application of
the Minnesota Constitution's free exercise clause in State v. Hershberger,State v. French,
and Hill-Murray Fed'n v. HillMurray High Sch.). Minnesota's Free Exercise clause states
that "[tihe right of every man to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience shall never be infringed;... nor shall any control of or interference with
the rights of conscience be permitted." MINN. CONST. art. I., § 16.
342. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990); accordState v. French,
460 N.W.2d 2, 11 (1990) (acknowledging the comparative strength of Minnesota's free
ta Constitution.
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reflects the Minnesota Supreme Court's disposition toward Minnesota's
free exercise clause, and not Minnesota's establishment clause.s Yet
the Minnesota Supreme Court did not explicitly, or even implicitly,
suggest the statement exclusively referred to the free exercise clause of
article I, section 16.'" If both are textually far stronger than their
federal counterparts, then both establishment and free exercise clauses
should be applied in a manner recognizing their more prohibitive
nature."5 Adhering to the literal requirements of some constitutional amendments while ignoring other amendments' mandates would be
Doing so would have the dual effect of
logically inconsistent.
rendering Minnesota's constitutional text unreliable and fostering
appearances that the Minnesota Supreme Court capriciously interprets
constitutional amendments.
If Minnesota's establishment clauses are interpreted in a consistent
fashion, school voucher legislation that includes parochial schools faces
an imposing obstacle to being upheld by the Minnesota Supreme
Commentators acknowledge that the strength of states'
Cour't.
establishment clauses may require amendment to ensure school

exercise clause).
343. Mammenga I, 500 N.W.2d at 139 ("The Hershbergercourt was not referring to
the specific clause at issue in this case. It was instead discussing the general free
exercise and establishment components of the Minnesota Constitution.").
344. See id.; cf. Americans United, 288 Minn. at 213, 179 N.W.2d at 155. In Americans
United, the court squarely dealt with article VIII., section 2 (now article XIII, section 2),
which is one of Minnesota's two establishment clauses. It said that the limitations of
the Minnesota Constitution are substantially more restrictive" than the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 213, 179 N.W.2d at 155. This precedent contradicts the Mammenga court's
implication that the Minnesota Supreme Court has not expressed that Article XIII,
Section 2 is more prohibitive than the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
345. SeeJones, supra note 332, at 1317 ("It should not be assumed that courts will
employ disingenuous reasoning to circumvent the constitutional mandates" of more
prohibitive state constitutional provisions.). Perhaps offering a glimpse of the
Minnesota Supreme Court's view of article XIII, section 2 is Justice Coyne's dissent in
Women v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 38-39 (Minn. 1995) (Coyne, J., dissenting). Justice
Coyne suggested that article I, section 16, though expanding free exercise protections
beyond the U.S. Constitution's reach, had not been expanded beyond Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) because of article XIII, section 2's existence. Justice
Coyne suggested this article "comports with the decision of Lemon." The Lemon Court
found that statutes supplementing private school teachers' salaries, as well as providing
reimbursements for text books and instruction materials were unconstitutional. Lemon,
403 U.S. at 625. The states' statutes could not separate benefits along secular and
sectarian lines without excessive government entanglement into religion. Id. at 616,
619, 621. IfJustice Coyne is suggesting this is the Minnesota Supreme Court's stance
toward aid to religious schools, then school voucher legislation would face the
impossible task of separating benefits conferred to religious primary and secondary
schools to maintain constitutionality.
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vouchers' constitutionality when parochial schools participate.
Although school vouchers do not establish religion literally, they
undoubtedly support religious institutions. 41 Therefore, they would
very likely run afoul of both of Minnesota's establishment clauses.
V.

CONCLUSION

Though school vouchers floundered in Minnesota's Legislature this
year, they will return. If ever able to muster enough support to be
enacted, school vouchers would face establishment clause challenges.
The most recent cases analyzing statutes conferring benefits to
religious schools demonstrate that the U.S. Supreme Court would find
a school voucher plan constitutional under any existing analytical
frameworks. Federally-funded school voucher programs, or comparable state-funded voucher programs challenged under the federal
constitution's establishment clause would probably avoid collision with
the walls separating church and state.
If funded from Minnesota's coffers, school voucher legislation
including parochial schools must resist Minnesota's walls separating
church and state. These walls would prove more difficult to resist for
school voucher legislation. Nonetheless, Governor Arne Carlson
expressed confidence that school vouchers could steer clear of
Minnesota's constitutional barriers." s This position draws limited
support from Minnesota courts' analyses of statutes challenged under
the state's establishment clauses. Nevertheless, Minnesota's constitution, at least in word, separates church and state with walls far higher
than does the federal constitution. This fact, coupled with the
Minnesota Supreme Court's willingness to apply amendments
commensurably with their textual strength, endanger state-supported
school voucher legislation including parochial schools. For this reason,
if state-funded school vouchers crash into a wall separating church and

346. Cleveland, supra note 340, at 139 (noting that state constitutions may need
amending before parochial schools could participate in a school voucher program);
Jones, supra note 332, at 1317 (noting Pennsylvania citizens can amend the state's
constitution so school voucher legislation can include religious schools); see also Coffman,
supra note 10, at 1A. Roger Moe, the Minnesota Senate's majority leader, suggests
putting article XIII, section 2 up for a referendum vote. This would allow voters to
amend the amendment so parochial schools can participate in a school voucher

program. Id.
347. Voucher legislation receives strong support from private schools, Christian

conservatives, and Roman Catholic Bishops. Coffman, supra note 10, at 1A. All of these
groups surely want America's children to be better educated, but their enthusiasm over
school vouchers is at least partially motivated by the fact that publicly-funded school
vouchers would go toward supporting religion.

348. O'Connor, supra note 9, at 1A.
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state, it will be into Minnesota's constitutional walls, not the federal
constitution's.
Eric Nasstrom
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